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Abstract
The Islamist student movement, al-Jamā´a al-`Islāmiyya, emerged on the Egyptian universities in 
the 1970s, winning landslide victories in a number of student elections and also gaining increasing 
influence in society outside campus. The movement was a loose composition of students with 
different persuations, from apolitical Salafists to violent Jihadists bent on toppling the regime.  
Shortly before the assassination of Anwar Sadat in 1981, al-Jamā´a al-`Islāmiyya disintegrated due 
to differences regarding violence as a political tool. 
This thesis demonstrates the pivotal role played by the Muslim Brotherhood in regard to 
changing the minds of the majority of the Islamist students on the issue of violence. Brotherhood 
members approached central leaders of al-Jamā´a al-`Islāmiyya as early as 1975 and were able to 
persuade the students into adopting anti-violent position. 
This thesis highlights the potential of change and moderation within Islamist movement 
inclined to violence. 
Many of the moderate student leaders joined the Muslim Brotherhood and their generation 
has influenced Egyptian politics and public life for decades. Now they will play a part in shaping 
society in post-Mubarak Egypt. 
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Foreword
This master thesis is a result of a year long study of the Islamist student movement in Egypt in the 
1970s and its relationship with the Muslim Brotherhood. 
Egypt and the region at large has changed tremendously since I started my work. Though my 
research may be void of any direct links to the demonstrations that eventually toppled the Mubarak 
regime on February 11th this year, the events still made the process of writing more exiting.  
There are some that deserve special gratitude for helping me finishing the thesis. First of all, 
I would like to thank my supervisor, associate professor Bjørn Olav Utvik, for advice and guidance 
along the way, both during my stay in Cairo and in the hectic weeks before the thesis was finished. 
The Fault Lines of Islamism project also deserves thanks for granting me a scholarship in order to 
write this thesis. It has been most helpful. 
I would also like to direct a special thanks to the proprietors of Maktaba `Ayman li-Turāth 
on the bookmarked in `Adhbbakiyya who gave me invaluable assistance in my search for Arabic 
literature. ´Abd al-Mun´im `Abū al-Futūḥ, `Abū al-´Ilā Māḍī, `Usāma Ḥāfiẓ and ´Iṣām al-´Aryān all 
deserves gratitude for letting me interview them. 
Last but not least, I must thank my wife, Eva, for enduring support and patience.
Brussels, May 12th, 2011.
Note on Transcription, Names and Abbreviations  
As this thesis is based on Arabic sources to a great extent, I have chosen to transcribe most names. 
The exceptions are the names of people and places that are familiar in the West. Hence, I refer to 
Egypt's second President as Nasser, not Jamāl ´Abd al-Nāṣir. The Mediterranean city is called 
Alexandria, while I have chosen to transcribe lesser known cities such as `Asyūṭ and al-Manṣūra.
Concepts which a Western audience will be accustomed to, such as the Sharia (Islamic Law) 
and Shia Muslims (Islam's second largest denomination), however, will not be transcribed. I have 
also chosen not to apply the system of so-called sun-letters as it would have served few purposes in 
the context of this thesis.  
For translations of the titles of books and articles in Arabic and Norwegian, I refer to the 
bibliography.
Because I think too many abbreviations obstruct the language, I have chosen only to cut 
short al-Jamā´a al-`Islāmiyya (JI). 
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Chapter I: Historical Background and Hypothesis
On January 25th this year a peaceful revolt began in Egypt with the demand that President Hosni 
Mubarak resigned. Over the next weeks the demonstrations grew in size until Mubarak finally 
stepped down on February 11th – ending his nearly 30 year long rule.  
In the wake of the historic resignation, the Muslim Brotherhood took centre stage as the 
most organised political force by far in Egypt. The Islamists threw their weight behind the 
constitutional reforms which were approved by a popular referendum on March 19 th.  In April the 
movement formed the Freedom and Justice Party with the aim of contesting about 50 percent of the 
seats in the parliamentary elections coming up in September.
Many central figures in the Muslim Brotherhood started their political careers as activists in 
the Islamist student movement al-Jamā´a al-`Islāmiyya in the 1970s. With its numerous ideological  
inputs the movement soon spread to most universities in Egypt, winning sweeping victories in the 
student elections. However, towards the end of the decade the movement became increasingly 
divided over the question of violence as a means for political change – a discord that eventually led 
to the disintegration of al-Jamā´a al-`Islāmiyya in the early 1980s. 
The purpose of this thesis is to show how the Muslim Brotherhood persuaded a majority of 
the student leaders to denounce the use of violence and join the `Ikhwān, and how this choice 
eventually led to al-Jamā´a al-`Islāmiyya's demise. The effort paid off for the Brotherhood, 
however. It was provided with a generation of highly capable members who made their mark in 
Egyptian society for decades and may very well be instrumental in the shaping of the country's 
future.
Before I present my hypothesis, I will define the concept of Islamism and then give the 
reader an overview of the history of Islamism in Egypt.      
Defining Islamism 
Political Islam, Islamic fundamentalism, Islamicism, Islamism – the names depicting the  
phenomenon of politicised Islam are many. In my opinion, not all of them are very accurate, for 
example Islamic fundamentalism.1 As the most common label today is Islamism, I will stick to that. 
With regard to this thesis, I have chosen to base my interpretation of Islamism on the 
Norwegian scholar Bjørn Olav Utvik, who defines the Islamist movement as 
1 Fundamentalism was first used to describe Christian Protestant sects in the U.S. After the First World War. The 
difference between these sects and Islamism is substantial. Roger Owen, State Power and Politics in the Making of  
the Modern Middle East (London, Routledge, 2004), 156.
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...an ideological direction which emphasises that the religion of Islam not only concerns 
the individual's relation to faith, but contains God-given guidelines which also should 
apply to societal, legal and political matters in Muslim societies. For most Islamists, this 
view implies the demand that Sharia, the Islamic law based on the Koran and the 
Prophet's Sunna, must be the basis of the law.2
First and foremost, the definition is broad and inclusive, which is an advantage as far as the 
thesis is concerned, because a number of movements and groups will be referred to. When sticking 
to this definition, they will all be considered Islamist, as they have a common goal; namely a  
society which is based on the Sharia. 
Their visions of the nature of such a state may differ, but in regard to the mission of this 
thesis, the interesting point is which methods the different groups or individuals apply to pursue the 
goal of an Islamic state. 
My choice of definition makes it easier to separate between the ones that advocate the use of 
violence as necessary for reaching that goal and the ones that do not deem it imperative. In this 
thesis the former category of Islamists will be referred to as radicals and the latter referred to as 
moderates. Hence, the possibility that Islamists classified as moderates can harbour views that 
many will consider to be extreme can occur. In this thesis however, they will still be referred to as 
moderates. 
A Short Overview of the History of Islamism in Egypt
The ideologisation of Islam can be traced back to the mid to late 19 th century and has been an 
attribute of Muslim politics ever since.3 The thinker Jamāl al-Dīn al-`Afghānī (1838-97) is together 
with Muḥammad ´Abduh (1849-1905) often credited as the origin of Islamism. The aim of these 
«Islamic modernists» – looking to counter the Western influence that was building in the Muslim 
world at the time – was to show that Islam and modernism were not opposites.4 Islam, ´Abduh 
claimed, was a religion based on reason, as opposed to Christianity which was not. Their movement 
«sought to accommodate Islam with the ideas of modern secularism» and appeared in many ways as 
a progressive movement – containing the first feminist movements in Islam, for instance.5 
These were merely seeds for coming generations to reap, though. The thoughts of al-
2 Bjørn Olav Utvik, Islamismen (Oslo: Unipub, 2011), 24.
3 Sami Zubaida, «Political Modernity», in Islam and Modernity: Key Issues and Debates, ed. Muhammad Khalid 
Masud, Armando Salvatore and Martin van Bruinessen (Edinburgh, Edinburgh University Press, 2009), 78.
4 Muhammad Khalid Masud, «Islamic Modernism», in Islam and Modernity: Key Issues and Debates, 241-42.
5 Cyril Glassé, The Concise Encyclopædia of Islam, Revised Edition. (London: Stacey International, 2002), 395-96.
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`Afghānī and ´Abduh did not penetrate the lower classes and accordingly they failed to gather a 
popular following.
The first broad, popular Islamist movement to appear was the Muslim Brotherhood, founded 
in the Egyptian town of `Ismā´īliyya in 1928. The `Ikhwān emerged independently of the traditional 
´ulamā`, and concentrated on teaching Islamic morals and ethics, as well as working for the 
restoration of religious law and Islamic hegemony in public life.6  
During its heydays in the 1930s and 40s, the Muslim Brotherhood gathered a large 
following, consisting of people with a traditional Muslim education; clerks, lower civil servants,  
students, shopkeepers and generally people aggrieved and deprived of their status by foreign 
domination and the increasing westernisation. Although the leader al-Bannā advocated a return to 
Islamic piety and a society based on the principles of the Koran, the `Ikhwān were at the same time 
underlining the need to adapt these principles to a modern world. They did not seek to transform 
society into a blueprint of Arabia, in the seventh century, that is. 
In the crisis-stained years after the Second World War, the tension increased between 
different power blocs in Egypt, leading to the assassination of both Prime Minister Maḥmūd Fahmī 
al-Nuqrāshī Bāshā in December 1948 and Ḥasan al-Bannā in February the following year. Although 
the Brotherhood was regarded as a serious contender for power at the time, it was the Free Officers 
(al-Ḍubāṭ al-`Aḥrār) that stroke first, staging a bloodless military coup on July 23rd 1952. 
Even if the ties between the new military regime and the Brotherhood were initially good, 
they soon deteriorated, and after the attempt on President Nasser's life in 1954, the movement was 
driven underground. 
As a consequence, Islamic activism was close to being non-existent in Egypt until the 1970s 
– the prison camps containing the brothers were the exception.7 The aftermath of the Egyptian 
defeat in the Six Day War of 1967, however, and especially after the death of Nasser in 1970, saw a 
revival of Islamism.8
The revival of Islamism: Why?
What did cause the Islamic resurgence? Most fingers point towards the failure of what Richards and 
Waterbury labels the «old order», i.e. Nasser's Arab Socialism.9 One reason was the great promises 
of Nasserism, which, though fulfilled in the initial years, failed to materialise come the mid 1960s 
6 Ira M. Lapidus, A History of Islamic Societies (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 521-522.
7 Bjørn Olav Utvik, «Ḥizb al-Wasat and the Potential for Change in Egyptian Islamism», Critique: Critical Middle 
Eastern Studies vol. 14, no. 3 (Fall 2005), 296. 
8 Lapidus, A History of Islamic Societies, 529.
9 Alan Richards and John Waterbury, A Political Economy of the Middle East (Boulder: Westview Press, 1998), 348.
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when the economy stagnated and job-creation was brought to a halt. Frustration was also building 
with the authoritarianism of the Nasserist state, whose nationalistic and ideological slogans 
appeared hollow after the disastrous defeat in the 1967 war.10
Is it then possible to reduce the re-emergence of Islamism to economic hardship and social 
grievances? Probably not. «Blocked careers, unemployment, rampant corruption, unavailable 
housing all set the context for Islamism, but they are poor predictors of exactly who will 
participate» in Islamist movements, Richards and Waterbury points out.11 Would there be no 
Islamists if all these «wrongs» were corrected, they ask, rather rhetorically.
There have also been attempts to explain the rise of Islamism by referring to their 
demographic roots. These studies highlighted the fact that members of Islamist groups were highly 
educated end tended to have recently migrated from the countryside to urban centres.12 The social 
alienation these people suffered in the cities, uprooted from their families, made them receptive to  
the Islamic message of tradition, goes the arguing. This account also presents Islamisation of young 
people as a phenomenon that can be avoided, given that certain circumstances are altered.
However, disenchanted young people do not all become Islamists. As Richards and 
Waterbury emphasise, some may just as well fall into drugs and crime, hard work or simply 
indifference.13 And, in Egypt, members of the last category may be just as numerous as the 
Islamists. 
The above-mentioned explanations fail to take into account the appeal of Islam to the 
individual, and reduces the role of piety and faith in the Islamic identity. «People do not come to 
Islam as an alternative for their social misfortunes. People come to Islam in response to a call, a call  
which goes very far and deep in the human soul», said the Moroccan Islamic leader, ´Abd al-Salām 
Yāsīn, as a response to the reduction of Islamism to socioeconomic circumstances.14
In other words, one must also appreciate the potential of mobilisation within Islam. This is 
especially true in countries where inhabitants daily are reminded of Islamic history and the 
appropriateness of some practices and the inappropriateness of others.15
Or, as Wickham puts it: «Islamist mobilizers in Egypt did not simply exploit the frustrations 
of unemployed and underemployed youth. Rather, they engaged in a massive ideological project to 
10 Lapidus, A History of Islamic Societies, 529.
11 Richards and Waterbury,  Political Economy of the Middle East, 348-49, 324.
12 Mohammed M. Hafez and Quintan Wiktorowicz, «Violence as Contention in the Egyptian Islamic Movement», in 
Islamic Activism: A Social Movement Theory Approach, ed. Quintan Wiktorowicz (Bloomington: Indiana University 
Press, 2004), 64-65.
13 Richards and Waterbury,  Political Economy of the Middle East, 348-49, 324.
14 Richards and Waterbury,  Political Economy of the Middle East, 324.
15 Owen, State Power and Politics in the Making of the Modern Middle East, 156.
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capture the hearts and minds of possible recruits».16 I would argue that this project was made easier 
by the government's control of Islamic institutions such as al- al-`Azhar, which started as early as 
the 1890s. It was Nasser, however, that first started to actively use al-`Azhar as a source of 
legitimacy for the regime. The government domination led to a loss of credibility for al-`Azhar in  
some parts of the population, according to Moustafa.17 This in turn, fuelled radical Islamism, he 
argues. 
Previous Research
Thanks to the assassination of President Sadat in 1980, the killing of tourists visiting Luxor in 1997 
and the September 11th attacks – where the most infamous participant, Mohammed Atta, was 
Egyptian – much has been written about the Islamist movement in Egypt. 
However, the research, or press reports for that matter, tends to focus solely on the group 
behind the Sadat assassination, Tanẓīm al-Jihād, or another group responsible for attacks on tourists 
in Luxor in 1997, al-Jamā´a al-Islāmiyya.18 
When concerned with years preceding the murder of Sadat, much emphasis is put on two 
other organisations: namely Munaẓẓamat al-Taḥrīr al-`Islāmī (often just referred to as al-Fanniyya 
al-´Askariyya) and Jamā´at al-Muslimīn (better known as al-Takfīr wa al-Hijra). The former draws 
attention because of its failed coup in 1974, whereas the latter is often highlighted due to its 
obscurity and the members' kidnapping and killing of an Egyptian minister in 1977. 
These groups clashed with the government, though none of them had a large following. 
Jamā´at al-Muslimīn for instance, may have had between 3.000 and 5.000 members.19 Compared 
with the organisation that actually wielded some political power during the 1970s, al-Jamā´a al-
`Islāmiyya (JI), the Islamist student movement, the above-mentioned groups are dwarfed. Firstly, JI 
is thought to have commanded around one-fifth to one-third of Egyptian students at the height of 
their power in the 1970s.20 Secondly, the organisation triumphed in a number of student elections 
and with time outgrew the universities, arranging open air prayers for all to take part in. These 
prayers gathered tens of thousands of participants. 
Despite JI being matched only by the Muslim Brotherhood a far as membership and political 
16 Carrie Rosefsky Wickham, Mobilizing Islam: Religion, Activism and Political Change in Egypt (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 2002), 120.
17 Tamir Moustafa, «Conflict and Cooperation between the State and Religious Institutions in Contemporary Egypt», 
Journal of Middle East Studies, vol. 32, no. 1 (February, 2000), 17.
18 Al-Jamā´a al-`Islāmiyya referred to here, is the radical and violent organisation that deveoped from 1981 and 
onwards, not the student organisation subject to this study.
19 Raymond A. Hinnebusch, Egyptian Politics under Sadat (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), 205.
20 Hinnebusch, Egyptian Politics under Sadat, 205.
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power are concerned, JI have rarely been put under scrutiny in the 30 years that have passed since 
its dissolvement. Despite some shortcomings which I will return to, Gilles Kepel's Muslim 
Extremism in Egypt: The Prophet and the Pharaoh towers as the most influential work, covering 
both JI and the other parts of the Islamist movement in 1970s Egypt. Apart from Kepel's book, JI is 
treated briefly in works about the Muslim Brotherhood, such as Alison Pargeter's The Muslim 
Brotherhood: The Burden of Tradition where a couple of pages are dedicated to the relations 
between the `Ikhwān and JI in the 1970s. A few pages in Ahmed Abdalla's The Student Movement  
and National Politics in Egypt 1923-1973 is committed to the rise of Islamist groups on campus, 
but his work does first and foremost concern itself with Egyptian students up until the emergence of 
JI.
Additionally, JI is mentioned shortly in books covering the Sadat era, like Raymond A. 
Hinnebuschs Egyptian Politics under Sadat and Sadat and After: Struggles for Egypt's political  
Soul by Raymond William Baker. Far from examining JI in depth, they also fail to make a firm 
distinction between jamā´a and jamā´āt. In other words, the Islamist student movement that took the 
name al-Jamā´a al-`Islāmiyya in the early 1970s is not always clearly separated from other Islamist  
groups (jamā´āt) operating at the time.   
In the Arabic language few if any authoritative works have been published. ´Ādil `Amīn al-
Muḥāmī has produced two volumes on the student uprisings of 1972 and 1973, Intifāḍa al-ṭalaba  
al-miṣriyyin, but as Islamist student never played a prominent role in those demonstrations, they do 
not figure heavily in that work. Hāla Muṣṭafā's Al-Niẓām al-siyāsī wa al-mu´āraḍa al-`islāmiyya fi  
Miṣr is a detailed work which analyses the ties between the Sadat regime and the Muslim 
Brotherhood, but few pages touch upon JI.21  
Thus, one is left with books about the Islamic movement in general. A couple of 
autobiographies have appeared in recent years, however, most notably Shāhid ´alā tārīkh al-ḥaraka  
al-`islāmiyya fī Miṣr 1970-1984, by ´Abd al-Mun´im `Abū al-Futūḥ, one of the most influential JI 
leaders in the 1970s.22 
Apart from Kepel's «Muslim Extremism in Egypt», the only other work I have found that 
concerns itself solely with JI, is the master thesis of the Norwegian researcher Truls Hallberg 
Tønnessen from 2005, «Egyptiske studenter mellom Marx og Muhammad: Framveksten av den 
islamske studentbevegelsen 1970-1981».23 However, his main concern in the thesis is how JI rose to 
power at the universities in the 1970s and the general Islamisation of campus, not the organisation's 
21 The title of this book may appear to be Al-Dawla wa al-harakāt al-`islāmiyya al-mu´āraḍa: Bayna al-muhādana wa  
al-muwājaha. However, the title I refer to is the one given by the publisher on page 3. 
22 This book was published in Egypt in October 2010, but an unedited manuscript have been available on `Abū al-
Futūḥ's website for some years. 
23 The work is written in Norwegian. See bibliography for an adequate translation of the title. 
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split.
Hypothesis
The topic of this master thesis is the reasons for the dissolution of JI, the Islamist student 
movement, in 1981. My hypothesis is as follows:
The Muslim Brotherhood acted as a force of moderation within al-Jamā´a al-`Islāmiyya  
from the middle of the 1970s, which eventually led to the break-up of the organisation.
Obviously, this hypothesis rests on a number of preconditions, which I will account for in the 
following pages.
Firstly, the Muslim Brotherhood had to be a moderate organisation that rejected violence. 
The `Ikhwān distanced itself from the use of violence and struck a moderate chord after the 
crackdown on Tanẓīm 1965 in that very year. By the time JI was founded, the Brotherhood had 
quite good relation with the Sadat regime. And, although they were not formally a legal 
organisation, they opted to work within the domain of politics to pursue their goal of an Islamic 
state. 
Secondly, there had to be a radical current within JI at the organisation's outset. Kepel 
claims that Sayyid Quṭb was a great source of inspiration for the members of JI.24 And, while Kepel 
at times gives the impression that Quṭb was the only influence of JI, moderates like `Abū al-Futūḥ 
admit that Quṭb was widely read and that the use of violence was not rejected, but more a question 
of timing.25 Another JI leader belonging to the moderate camp, `Abū al-´Ilā Māḍī, also points out 
that violent currents was not outright condemned in the initial years.26 
Thirdly, the Muslim Brotherhood had to make contact with parts of JI from the middle of the  
1970s. ´Iṣām al-´Aryān, another JI leader, recalls meeting prominent members of the `Ikhwān 
before 1976.27 According to `Abū al-Futūḥ, his first contact with the Brotherhood occurred in 
1975.28 At the time, this was a hot topic surrounded by secrecy in Islamist circles. Now, however, no 
24 Gilles Kepel, Muslim Extremism in Egypt: The Prophet and the Pharaoh (Los Angeles: University of California 
Press, 2003), 155.
25 ´Abd al-Mun´im `Abū al-Futūḥ, Shāhid ´alā tārīkh al-ḥaraka al-ìslāmiyya fī miṣr 1970-1984, ed. Ḥussām Tammām 
(Cairo: Dār al-Shurūq, 2010), 65.
26 `Abū al-´Ilā Māḍī, Jamā´āt al-´unf al-miṣriyya wa ta`wīlātha li-l-`islām: al-juḍūr - al-`asas al-fikriyya – al-murāja
´āt (Cairo: Maktbat al-Shurūq al-Duwaliyya, 2006), 17-18. 
27 «Al-´Aryān ytaḥaddathu ´an nasha`a al-tayār al-`islāmī bi-l-jāma´āt al-miṣriyya», Ikhwanonline, accessed March 
20th, 2011, http://www.ikhwanonline.com/Article.asp?ArtID=7008&SecID=270. 
28 `Abū al-Futūḥ, Shāhid ´alā tārīkh al-ḥaraka al-ìslāmiyya fī miṣr 1970-1984, 95.
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one disputes that these meetings took place. 
Fourthly, the Brotherhood had to be able to win over a substantial number of JI members. 
Most of the JI leaders in Cairo and Alexandria chose to affiliate with the `Ikhwān, according to 
`Abū al-Futūḥ.29 That view is shared by Utvik, who notes that a large section of the JI rank-and-file 
members went on to join the Brotherhood.30
Fifthly, factions within JI had to reject the influence of the Brotherhood, eventually causing  
a rift. Māḍī recalls great fury among the radicals when the news about the moderates' affiliation 
with the `Ikhwān broke.31 `Abū al-Futūḥ says that their membership was kept secret because they 
anticipated strong opposition from the Salafi and Jihadi wings inside JI.32
Additional causes for the Division of JI
Having established the probability of my hypothesis, it is important to emphasise that the 
Brotherhood did not cause the dissolution of JI single-handedly by persuading leading figures to 
join them. Although I will argue that this was the main reason for the split, other circumstances 
contributed as well.
While I concentrate on inside factors when explaining the demise of JI, Kepel, and to a 
certain degree, Tønnessen, points to outside factors. In my eyes, Kepel's work is somewhat 
disorganised and clearly vague when it comes to the reasons for the collapse of JI. The ambiguity is 
first and foremost caused by his failure to make a distinction between the radical and moderate 
wings of JI, a flaw also underlined by Tønnessen.  
Hence, the disagreements within JI regarding the use of violence are not highlighted, which 
in turn leads to Kepel portraying the organisation as double-tongued: 
«While the Islamicists brandished sticks and clubs on the one hand, they also 
wrote articles seeking to protect their image as a peaceful force expressing the 
country's deepest sentiments and therefore unjustly persecuted by an iniquitous 
prince».33 
This reveals Kepel's failure to spot the different currents inside JI. The ones that brandished sticks 
were clearly not the same as those working to secure the organisation’s peaceful image, a point I 
will prove throughout this thesis.
29 `Abū al-Futūḥ, Shāhid ´alā tārīkh al-ḥaraka al-ìslāmiyya fī miṣr 1970-1984, 78.
30 Utvik, Islamist Economics in Egypt, 297.  
31 Māḍī, Jamā´āt al-´unf al-miṣriyya wa ta`wīlātha li-l-`islām, 20.
32 `Abū al-Futūḥ, Shāhid ´alā tārīkh al-ḥaraka al-ìslāmiyya fī miṣr 1970-1984, 95.
33 Kepel, Muslim Extremism in Egypt, 151.
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In Kepel's account, JI is abruptly broken up after confrontations with the regime, ending 
with widespread arrests on September 3rd 1981.34 The confrontation was «egged on» by the secret 
police, he claims, implying that the downfall of JI was due to the regime's loss of patience with the 
Islamists.35
Thus, the focus is solely fixed to the struggle between the government and JI, a fight the 
Sadat regime won. Kepel does not grasp JI's transformation from a broadly based student movement 
into two different groups, a dormant division that was there from the beginning, became wider in 
the middle of the 1970s and evident for everyone in 1980 – which I will show in this thesis.   
Tønnessen on the other hand, is aware of the differences that existed within JI, especially 
regarding the use of violence.36 Moreover, he points out that the rift the Muslim Brotherhood may 
have caused with its recruitment of central JI figures. However, when it comes to the organisation's 
split, he still highlights the external pressure. The repression from the regime made it harder for the 
moderates of JI to contain the radical elements within the organisation, he argues, adding that the 
pressure also forced JI from the universities.37 
I will not argue that the pressure put on JI by the regime did not contributed to its downfall. 
Tønnessen mentions that the repression may have hastened the divisions within JI, which may be 
true to some extent.38 However, he also suggests that the fact that JI was forced off campus led to 
tighter connections with the Brotherhood.39 The growing regime repression at the universities in 
1979 increased the collaboration with the Ìkhwān, he says, adding that the relationship became 
public the year after as JI was in need of new arenas of activity.
In this thesis I will argue that the connection with the Brotherhood was established at a much 
earlier point, and that central JI figures regarded the two organisations more or less as one after their 
graduation in 1976-77. The graduation of many of the leading members contributed in itself to the 
fragmentation of JI, although some tried to stay in touch with campus.
34 Kepel, Muslim Extremism in Egypt, 170.
35 Kepel, Muslim Extremism in Egypt, 237.
36 It should be noted that the dissolution of JI was not Tønnessen's focus in his thesis. And although he recommends 
further studies into the reasons behind the break, his thesis is nevertheless one of the most extensive works on that 
topic.
37 Truls Hallberg Tønnessen, «Egyptiske studenter mellom Marx og Muhammad: Framveksten av den islamske 
studentbevegelsen 1970-1981» (Master thesis, University of Oslo, 2005), 126.
38 Tønnessen, «Egyptiske studenter mellom Marx og Muhammad», 119.
39 Tønnessen, «Egyptiske studenter mellom Marx og Muhammad», 121.
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Methodology 
In order to put my hypothesis to the test, a qualitative methodology was chosen for this thesis. As 
opposed to quantitative data – collective data that can be measured by numbers – qualitative data  
are presented either in writing or speech. In my case, that meant the use of a mixture of interviews, 
autobiographies and secondary literature.  
I spent the time between October 12th and November 12th 2010 in Cairo doing research for 
the thesis. The time was divided between finding informants and conducting interviews and 
searching for relevant literature written in Arabic.
When contacting people in order to ask them for an interview, I had one great disadvantage, 
namely the parliamentary election in early December that year. At the time I arrived in Egypt, many  
of the old JI members were busy preparing for the Muslim Brotherhood's election campaign, and 
could therefore not find the time to meet me. 
I nevertheless conducted four interviews with former figureheads of JI. Three of them, `Abū 
al-´Ilā Māḍī, ´Iṣām al-`Aryān and ´Abd al-Mun´im `Abū al-Futūḥ, belonged to the what I have 
defined as the moderate wing, while one, `Usāma Ḥāfiẓ, was considered a radical. All interviews 
were digitally recorded.
In two of the cases, I had read memoir-like books published by the interviewees beforehand, 
which gave me the possibility to pinpoint my questions according to what I had read. In turn, this 
enabled me to obtain comprehensive answers on key issues, such as the ties with the Muslim 
Brotherhood and the position on the use of violence. It was also an advantage that I knew the 
biography of the interviewees when meeting them, hence no time was lost establishing their 
position and history with the JI. 
The interviews with the three men belonging to the moderate camp were conducted in more 
or less the same fashion, circling round early influences, the timing of the first contact with the 
Brotherhood, the developments regarding JI's stance on the use of violence, the relations with the 
radical wing and the repression by the regime. 
The interview with Ḥāfiẓ followed more or less the same formula. However, even more 
emphasis was put on the issue of violence, since he belonged to the radical wing, and on the subject 
of differences between Upper Egypt on one hand and Cairo and the Delta on the other, since he was 
born in al-Minyā and went to university in `Asyūṭ. 
It is important to underline that while the interviews followed a pattern, the sources were 
allowed to talk freely if they thought something particularly important.
While there is no denying the drawback of only having one interviewee from the radical side 
of JI, it is at the same time important to stress that the hypothesis concerns the influence of the 
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Muslim Brotherhood within JI. The influence was inevitably stronger among the moderates than the 
radicals and they should therefore be in a better position to talk about that subject.
A common problem when it comes to interviews of this character is the informants' bias. In 
this case the problem is possibly even more noteworthy because two of the interviewees, al-´Aryān 
and `Abū al-Futūḥ are veterans of the Muslim Brotherhood, occupying central positions. On top of 
that, Māḍī was a member of the `Ikhwān until forming his own party, Ḥizb al-Waṣat al-Jadīd, in 
1996. Although I never detected any obvious bias, the informants' answers and understanding of 
events will nevertheless be coloured by their present roles and their history with the movement. 
However, in regard to the Islamist movement in Egypt, and Egyptian politics in general, there are 
few unbiased figures. My experience is that most people belong to one camp or the other. And, 
since refraining from interviewing them is not an option – these people are sources of vast amounts 
of information – one must be careful to put their statements under close examination.
As to the literature, one of my goals from the offset was to use as many Arabic sources as 
possible. I command the language fairly well after three years of Arabic studies – one of them in 
Cairo. The main reason for the choice was the notion that Arab and first of all Egyptian scholars 
would have a closeness to the subject lacking in Western literature. While this is true when it comes 
to primary sources such as biographies and autobiographies, my impression is that there is a lack of 
authoritative research on JI conducted in Arabic. Just as in the West, there is a tendency to focus on 
the more violent 1980s and 90s or the assassination of President Sadat.
Moreover, obtaining the books that offer some examination and analysis of JI were not an 
easy task since such books were rare even in bookstores specialising in Arabic literature. An 
alternative way of getting my hands on relevant books was the `Adhbakiyya book market on 
Maydān al-´Ataba in Cairo. Although chaotic at first sight, it turned out to be my greatest source of 
literature in Arabic. 
And, in the end, I would argue that I managed to gather quite a wide range of works written 
in Arabic. The most noteworthy written primary sources have been `Abū al-Futūḥ's Shāhid ´alā  
tārīkh al-ḥaraka al-ìslāmiyya fī miṣr 1970-1984 and Māḍī's Jamā´āt al-´unf al-miṣriyya wa  
ta`wīlātha li-l-`islām, which have provided unprecedented detail about JI's development in the 
1970s.  
As for other secondary sources, the most important have been Kepel's Muslim Extremism in  
Egypt and Tønnessen's thesis «Egyptiske studenter mellom Marx and Muhammad». In analysing 
the relations between JI and the `Ikhwān, Alison Pargeter's The Muslim Brotherhood: The Burden of  
Tradition, was particularly helpful.  
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Chapter II The Rise of JI and its Ideological Basis
In this chapter, I will give a short introduction to the historical circumstances in which JI emerged 
on the universities in Egypt, while also discuss the ideological basis of the movement.  
The first part will consist of a short introduction to Egyptian politics in the late 1960s and 
early 1970s, before I deal with the formation of JI. The alleged role played by the Sadat regime in 
this process will be discussed in depth. That Sadat aspired to increase the regime's influence on 
campus, partially caused by the wish to strike down the leftists, is beyond doubt. Yet, when it comes 
to collaboration between JI and Sadat, the sources are more divided. I will argue that while Sadat 
encouraged JI and other Islamist organisations on campus, there is little to support allegations that 
the regime created or controlled JI. 
The second part will be spent accounting for the ideological foundation of JI and examining 
their religious and political goals as they were expressed in the first part of the decade. Besides 
pointing out the diversity of influences, the important question is whether or not JI, due to the 
ideological input, was a radical and violence-embracing organisation from the offset. This is an 
important question when it comes to determining developments in JI's view upon violence as a 
means for change, which will be dealt with in later chapters. 
Part 1
After Nasser's ascend to power in 1954 and the subsequent attempt to assassinate him later that year 
– allegedly planned by the Muslim Brotherhood – there was no room for popular Islamist 
movements no more. Until the defeat in the Six Day War of June 1967, Nasserism, Pan-Arabism 
and Secularism were the dominant ideologies rather than Islamism. 
As we shall see, the defeat gave Islamists a chance to get back at the stage, while Sadat's 
ascend to power three years later gave them a veritable boost. The new president was bent on 
distancing himself from his predecessor and in Islam he found the tool to help him embark on that 
process.
Nasser's «Fall from Grace» 
The tremendous popularity Nasser enjoyed throughout the 1950s and until the Six Day War in June 
1967 enabled the regime to subdue popular Islamist movements like the Muslim Brotherhood. The 
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`Ikhwān witnessed two crackdowns during the reign of Nasser, in 1954 and 1965, including arrests 
and executions.
The official institutions of Islam, like al-`Azhar University – the training ground of the 
´ulamā` of Egypt and other Muslim countries – were effectively brought under government control. 
From 1961 and onwards, al-`Azhar was expanded with four new and non-religious faculties which 
reduced the power of the rector and put the government in charge of the curriculum.40 The Sharia 
courts had been abolished already in 1955.  
The defeat in the war in 1967, al-Naksa, and not at least its humiliating circumstances, was a 
devastating blow for Nasser and his regime. Although «persuaded» by popular support to continue 
as president after his initial resignation, the Six Day War severely weakened Nasser. 
The economy that had started to lose steam in the mid 1960s was left in ruins.41 In the fiscal 
year following the defeat, Egypt's economy experienced negative growth. And, with the Israeli 
army on the east bank of the Suez Canal, Egypt had to accept donations from the old enemies Saudi 
Arabia and Kuwait to make up for the loss of revenue due to the cutting off of transport through the 
canal.42 Militarily, the defeat made Cairo more dependant on Moscow, with thousands of Soviet 
advisors flocking to Egypt.43
At the same time, students, workers and professionals began questioning the repressive 
nature of the regime and demanding liberalisation.44 At the forefront of the criticism were the 
students, with thousands of them taking part in the demonstrations in February 1968.45 The 
demonstrations were a reaction to the sentences in the trials against military figureheads in the 
aftermath of the Six Day War, which many considered far too soft.
On the ideological level, the 1967 defeat resulted in increasing religious activism.46 The 
secular ideology that was the basis of the Nasserist regime was discredited. For people who sought 
to fill the vacuum caused by the disgrace of Nasserism, Islam figured as a safe and familiar haven.47 
At the same time, the defeat gave Islamists ammunition in their criticism of the regime. Some 
members of the Muslim Brotherhood allegedly celebrated the humiliation of Egypt in 1967 because 
it revealed the corruption of the Nasser regime.48 
40 William L. Cleveland, A History of the Modern Middle East (Boulder: Westview Press, 2004), 320-21.
41 James Jankowski, Egypt: A Short History (Oxford: Oneworld Publications, 2000), 146.
42 Cleveland, A History of the Modern Middle East, 339.
43 Cleveland, A History of the Modern Middle East, 342.
44 Hamied Ansari, Egypt: The stalled Society (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1986), 141.
45 Ahmed Abdalla, The Student Movement and National Politics in Egypt 1923-1973 (Cairo: The American University 
in Cairo Press, 2008), 149.
46 Owen, State, Power and Politics in the Making of the Modern Middle East,155-56. 
47 Hinnebusch, Egyptian Politics under Sadat, 199.
48 Raymond William Baker, Sadat and After: Struggles for Egypt's Political Soul (Cambridge: Harvard University 
Press, 1990), 249. 
22
The defeat could be explained by the Egyptians' turning their backs on Islam, Islamists 
claimed.49 Islam had not been defeated, they argued, while imported western ideologies like 
Socialism and Secularism, had.
In the aftermath of the June 1967 a small number of Muslim Brotherhood members were 
released from jail, while on the universities the first religious societies, jamā´āt dīniyya, were 
starting to form.50 
The Believing President and the Islamisation of Society
It was the supposedly weak Anwar Sadat who was left with the task of filling the void after Nasser 
when the Arab hero died of a heart attack in September 1970. Despite having earned the nicknames 
of «Nasser's poodle» and «Bikbashi Sah-Sah» («Major yes-yes»), Sadat soon grabbed the reigns of 
power with both hands. In May 1971 he staged the so-called Corrective Revolution, cleansing the 
Arab Socialist Union of his Nasserist rivals.51  
The following month, thousands of members of the Muslim Brotherhood, including a 
number of its leaders, were released from jail, with Sadat hoping that the Islamists would provide 
him with a new power base to counter his foes on the left.52 In addition to the ones that were let out 
of Egyptian prisons, hundreds of Brotherhood members returned from exile in either Europe or 
other Arab countries. 
The Brotherhood had, along with other Islamist movements, regained the support of a wide 
range of middle class Egyptians.53 Meanwhile, Sadat was making an increasingly use of Islamic 
symbols in his official policy, styling himself as the al-ra`īs al-mu`min (the believing president) and 
making sure that he was photographed attending the Friday prayers. In the constitution that was 
passed in 1971, Islam was ascertained as the state religion, while the principles of the Islamic Sharia 
were made one of the sources of legislation.54 
Although receptive to the constitutional amendments, the main bulk of the Islamists thought 
that Sadat did not go far enough. Hence, the struggle for an Islamic state continued throughout the 
decade. The Islamists gained further concessions from the regime when the Sharia was elevated to 
49 Ali E. Hillal Dessouki, «The Resurgence of Islamic Organisations in Egypt: An Interpretation», in Islam and Power, 
ed. by Alexander S. Cudsi and Ali E. Hillal Dessouki (London: Croom Helm, 1981), 114.
50 Walid M. Abdelnasser, The Islamic Movement in Egypt: Perceptions of International Relations 1967-1981 (London: 
Kegan Paul International, 1994), 58-59.
51 Arthur Goldschmidt Jr., Modern Egypt: The formation of a Nation State (Boulder, Westview Press, 2004), 158-59.
52 Abdelnasser, The Islamic Movement in Egypt: Perceptions of International Relations 1967-1981, 58.
53 Saad Eddin Ibrahim, Egypt, Islam and Democracy (Cairo: The American University of Cairo Press, 2004), 36. 
54 Hāla Muṣṭafā, Al-Niẓām al-siyāsī wa al-mu´āraḍa al-`islāmiyya fi miṣr (Cairo: Markaz al-Maḥrūsa, 1996), 205-06.
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the main source of legislation in May 1980.55 Moreover, the Shaykh of al-`Azhar was promoted to 
the rank of prime minister as far as protocol and salary were concerned. 
The general liberalisation of the religious and political field also resulted in the building of  
mosques, supported by the government, on a scale never seen before in Egypt.56 The main bulk of 
these mosques were private (`ahlī) and hence beyond government control. Throughout the 1970s, 
the number of private mosques doubled from about 20.000 to 40.000. Only 6.000 were controlled 
by the Ministry of Religious Endowments (`Awqāf), a number Sadat tried to increase by a futile 
attempt to nationalise the private mosques later in the decade. 
The Emergence of Religious Societies on Campus   
Despite Sadat's Corrective Revolution, the spirit of his predecessor was very much alive at the 
Egyptian universities, where the left-wing students were the leading forces in the first part of the 
1970s.57
Not surprisingly, religion did not play any significant role on the universities in Egypt at that 
time. For instance, one of the later leaders of JI, ´Abd al-Mun´im `Abū al-Futūḥ, points out that 
when he entered the Faculty of Medicine in Qaṣr al-´Aynī at the University of Cairo in 1970, there 
was no Islamic activism worth mentioning and no faculty mosque.58 The first religious groups 
seems to have been formed by students – «religious by instinct» – who sought someone to pray 
alongside and a place to conduct it.59 
Gradually these groups gave themselves names such as the Religious Group (al-jamā´a al-
dīniyya) at the Faculty of Medicine in Cairo, and then began social work and mission (al-da´wa) on 
campus.60 
This happened in a number of universities in Egypt roughly at the same time. There are no 
indications however, that these developments were organised by a central leadership – the different 
groups cropped up independently of each other.61 The circumstances appear to have been quite 
similar though, as Ṣalāḥ Hāshim, considered among the founders of JI at the University of `Asyūṭ, 
gives testimony to.62 He recalls that when he entered university in 1972, there was a religious group 
55 Dessouki, «The Resurgence of Islamic Organisations in Egypt: An Interpretation», 109-10.
56 John L. Esposito and john O. Voll, Islam and Democracy (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996), 174-76. 
57 Rif´at Sayyid `Aḥmad, Limādhā qatalū al-Sādāt: Qiṣṣa tanẓīm al-Jihād (Cairo, al-Dār al-Sharqiyya, 1989), 106.  
58 `Abū al-Futūḥ, Shāhid ´alā tārīkh al-ḥaraka al-ìslāmiyya fī miṣr 1970-1984, 28.
59 `Abū al-Futūḥ, Shāhid ´alā tārīkh al-ḥaraka al-ìslāmiyya fī miṣr 1970-1984, 33.
60 Tønnessen, «Egyptiske studenter mellom Marx og Muhammad», 48. 
61 Tønnessen, «Egyptiske studenter mellom Marx og Muhammad», 49.
62 Mamdūḥ al-Shaykh, Al-Jamā´āt al-`islāmiyya al-miṣriyya al-mutashaddida fī `Ātūn 11 sibtambir: Mufāriqāt al-
nisha`a wa mujāzafāt al-taḥawwul (Cairo: Maktaba Madbūlī, 2005), 45-46.  
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present on campus, but it was far from an organised force. The group's main function was the 
holding of a weekly seminar, where famous shuyūkh such as Muḥammad Mutawallī al-Sha´rāwī, 
Muḥammad al-Ghazālī and Sayyid Sābiq came to speak.    
Despite the initial independence of each other, the different groups shared many features. 
They belonged to a generation which was one of the first to experience mass education due to the 
opening of the universities to students from the lower levels of society. Education for the lower 
classes was one of president Nasser's primary goals.63 In 1962 Nasser offered people an incentive to 
embark on a university degree, promising every graduate a government job. As a result, the number 
of students nearly doubled during the 1960s.
The promise of a government job stood firm in the Sadat era, and the 1970s saw an 
explosive growth in student numbers, from just below two hundred thousand in 1970 to above five 
hundred thousand in 1977.64 
The opening up of education was accompanied by the establishing of a number of new 
universities such as in Ṭanṭa and al-Manṣūra in 1972, al-Zaqāzīq in 1974 and Ḥilwān in 1975. The 
following year three universities, in al-Minyā, al-Minūfiyya and one serving the Suez Canal area, 
opened its doors. The new universities were not fit for the tidal wave of students and therefore badly 
equipped.65 The short supply of books and laboratory equipment, not to mention teachers, led to 
increasing discontent at the universities in the late 1960s. The situation turned from bad to worse in 
the 1970s. Lecture halls cramped with students – male and female – hefty sums for private tutoring 
necessary for passing exams and overcrowded dormitories were commonplace all over Egypt.66 
 
The Islamist Students' Background 
According to Ayubi, most of the members of the Islamist groups of the 1970s came from the lower 
middle classes and were between 20 and 30 years old.67 And, although they tended to come from 
urban areas, they had either rural or small town backgrounds. Notwithstanding the fact that Ayubi is 
referring to other and more violent parts of the Islamist movement, many of the JI leaders share 
these features as far as background is concerned. 
`Abū al-`Ilā Māḍī, JI leader in the latter half of the 1970s, grew up in a modest part of al-
Minyā in Upper Egypt.68 His father being a manual labourer, Māḍī was the first in his family to 
63 Cleveland, A History of the Modern Middle East, 320.
64 Kepel, Muslim Extremism in Egypt, 135.
65 Cleveland, A History of the Modern Middle East, 320.
66 Kepel, Muslim Extremism in Egypt, 135-36.
67 Nazih Ayubi, Political Islam: Religion and Politics in the Arab World (Routledge, London, 1991), 82.
68 Geneive Abdo, No God But God: Egypt and the Triumph of Islam (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002), 110.
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graduate from university. One of the founders of JI in Cairo, `Iṣām al-`Aryān was born in Nāhiya, a 
village in al-Jīza governorate just outside the capital. 
In his studies of various Islamist groups, Ibrahim has found that their members have come 
mainly from the middle and lower middle class in the cities.69 The rural element is present here as 
well, however, as the members' families tended to come from the countryside, having recently 
moved to urban areas. 
Furthermore, the Islamist students seem to have been inclined to profession studies such as 
medicine or engineering, which was – and still is – among the most attractive subjects among 
students in Egypt.70 This could be due to higher education being made available for the masses, and 
a wish among students from the lower classes to climb the social ladder. Ibrahim's studies of the 
Jamā´at al-Muslimīn provide some support for this theory. The group's members tended to be better 
educated than their parents, who shared the social profile of the early `Ikhwān of the 1930s and 
1940s.
The members of the Islamist movement were not entirely recruited from the mid and lower 
levels of society, though. Hinnebusch suggests that since its members managed to enter the 
attractive studies mentioned above, JI must also have appealed to the higher strata.71 There may be 
some truth in that. Kepel, for instance, argues that apart from the young urban poor whose families 
were still influenced by their rural and traditional roots, one more social class appeared receptive to  
the Islamists' call.72 This was the devout bourgeoisie, barred from political and economic power by 
the regimes in both the period of monarchy and military dictatorship. `Abū al-Futūḥ, for instance, 
describes his family as middle class, coming from al-Manyal in the Cairo district of Miṣr al-
Qadīma.73 Judging by his memoirs, however, it would be an exaggeration to brand his family 
background as bourgeois. 
It is nevertheless proof of JI's quite broad appeal and shows that the movement was not only 
restricted to the countryside or the recently urbanised classes in the small towns or popular districts 
of the big cities. In that regard, JI are quite in line with the broader Islamic movement in many 
countries in the Muslim world in the 1970s. The movement's support was based in the lower and 
lower middle classes, Dekmejian points out, while ascertaining that Islamic lifestyle also penetrated 
the middle and upper middle echelons in countries such as Egypt, Tunisia and Turkey.74     
69 Ibrahim, Egypt, Islam and Democracy, 25.
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The Government and the Islamists
As his predecessor, president Sadat also thought it important to control the students, fearing that his 
enemies would be able to turn them against the regime.75 The government disliked the revival of 
political activism on campus, especially the students' role in the demonstrations of 1972, and sought 
to stem this development.76 The regime's main target appears to have been the leftist, resulting in the 
formation of special squads that targeted left-leaning student leaders under the supervision of 
organisation secretary of the Arab Socialist Union, Muḥammad ´Uthmān `Ismā´īl. `Ismā´īl later 
went on to become governor of the province of `Asyūṭ between 1973 and 1982, where he, according 
to Kepel, gained a reputation for supporting the Islamists' struggle against Communists.77 
When examining allegations of close cooperation, however, it is important to have in mind 
the sources' lack of impartiality, as Tønnessen emphasises.78 The leftists have a habit of 
exaggerating the government's role, reducing the rise of Islamism to a phenomenon orchestrated by 
the regime, he points out. Some Islamists on the other hand, are keen to reject the role of the regime 
altogether.
According to Abdalla, the student group Shabāb al-`Islām – formed in 1972-73 as a 
counterweight to the leftist dominance on Cairo Polytechnical and with the aim of affirming the 
Islamic political presence on campus – was immediately contacted by regime officials with offers of 
money in return for instigating violence against the leftists.79 The offer was nevertheless turned 
down, he underscores. 
According to `Abū al-Futūḥ, however, Shabāb al-`Islām appeared quite spontaneously on 
campus.80 He depicts them as more government-inclined than JI, and not as rigorous with regard to 
clothes, beards and other Islamic insignia. While `Abū al-Futūḥ implies that Muḥammad ´Uthmān 
`Ismā´īl may have played a pivotal part in the founding of Shabāb al-`Islām, he does not attach 
much importance to the group, emphasising that it disappeared quite rapidly. This could of course 
be due to the fact that `Abū al-Futūḥ belonged to a «rival» Islamist group. Yet, in hindsight the role 
played by Shabāb al-`Islām on the political scene was nowhere near that of JI, and if this was the 
only group the regime managed to penetrate, their influence did not reach very far.  
In regard to the formation of JI, there are few indications, if any, of the government having 
75 Abdalla, The Student Movement and National Politics in Egypt 1923-1973, 213.
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any say, apart from looking upon the movement with favourable eyes in the initial years. Hāshim 
mentions for instance that a religious group sponsored by the university administration existed 
when he started in 1972.81 
There is nevertheless a wide belief that Sadat and his henchmen, like `Ismā´īl, just about 
single-handedly gave birth to the Islamist current among the students. According to Ansari, both 
leftists and movements on the political right were convinced that the Islamists enjoyed official  
encouragement and privileges from the regime.82 
While, in my opinion, this is a far too narrow explanation for what turned out to be such a 
powerful political force in the Egyptian society in the 1970s, one cannot totally deny the role played 
by the regime in encouraging Islamic activism on the universities. For example, both parties had 
common interest in reducing the influence of the leftists on campus and thus it may have appeared 
as if they were cooperating. 
`Abū al-Futūḥ denies in very clear words that there ever was a deal with the Sadat regime, 
but concedes that a numbers of obstacles in the Islamist movement's way were removed by the 
government.83 Those very same «obstacles» were also removed for other political forces, he claims. 
While `Abū al-Futūḥ's second statement is an exaggeration – there is no reason that Sadat should 
have taken great pains to purge the government of leftists and at the same time leave their comrades 
on the universities unheeded – there is a distinct difference between create and support. Sadat 
undoubtedly supported the Islamist student movement, although there is little evidence of him 
creating the likes of JI. And, although he wished to control Islamist groups on campus – for them to 
become the base of the regime inside the universities, as ´Alī mentions – there is hardly anything 
that supports allegations that the regime was in command of JI.84 
The fact that government representatives supported a number of JI's events and members of 
the Muslim Brotherhood were permitted to meet the students on campus, is neither evidence of 
creation nor control, only of support.85 
Moreover, developments later in the decade, for instance the souring of the relations with the 
government over key issues, also suggests that JI was established and grew independently. 
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Part 2
While much has been written about what influenced the violent JI of the 1980s, not much research 
has been conducted into the ideological basis that inspired those who founded JI as a religious 
student movement.
Before pointing out the most important sources of inspiration and ideological fundament of 
JI, it is important to emphasise that this never was a streamlined organisation with clear influences 
and a coherent background.86 As `Abū al-´Ilā Mādī – one of the leaders of JI in al-Minyā in the late 
1970s – recalls, the movement had «no organisational ties, not even intellectual ties, because of the 
lack of a real organisation».87 
As much of an exaggeration of the disunity of JI as this may be, it underlines the nature of 
an organisation that in its early years drew influences from a wide range of Islamic scholars and 
movements. It was ideologically immature and lacked both a clear policy and a defined project,  
apart from their quite ambiguous goal of Islamising campus.88
Although Sayyid Quṭb's affiliation with the Muslim Brotherhood is far beyond doubt, I have 
chosen to deal with his influence on JI in a separate part of this chapter. This is due to Quṭb and his 
writings having more leverage and influence on groups and movements embracing violence 
compared with his standing in the Brotherhood in the years that have passed his execution in 1966. 
In short, I have chosen to deal with him as jihādī  ideologue rather than a Muslim brother.   
Mawdudi and Jamaat-e islami
One of the sources of influence often mentioned by former members of JI, is the Pakistani ´ālim, 
journalist and politician Abu al-Ala Mawdudi (1903-1979). 
Mawdudi was the first to develop the concept of jāhiliyya which he used to describe states, 
governments or societies who failed to exercise the divine law of Sharia.89 Jāhiliyya, «the state of 
ignorance», was traditionally applied to the societies of pagan pre-Islamic times on the Arab 
Peninsula. However, Mawdudi saw the non-appliance of Islamic law in self-proclaimed Muslim 
countries as an equation of this paganism. Although the concept originates with Mawdudi, it was 
developed further and given a wider audience by Sayyid Quṭb, which I will return to later. 
More important in relation to Mawdudi and JI, is the former's notion of tawhīd as a part of 
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87 Māḍī, Jamā´āt al-´unf al-maṣriyya wa ta`wīlātuha li-l-`islām, 16-17. 
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29
his political agenda. Mawdudi saw Islam as more of an ideology than simply a religion and 
advocated for instance that the Islamic state was the sixth pillar of the religion.90 Social ills, he 
believed, could be overcome by a literal reading of the Koran and a return to the practises of the 
early Medinan community.91 Hence, the solution to the problems faced by the Muslims of India was 
to become better Muslims.92 Western and secular influences should be refused.   
In this respect, tawhīd became not only an expression of the unity and oneness of God – as is 
the original meaning of the word – but also a concept of Islam as a «system that was 'complete and 
total’ that could not only interpret the larger world, but also transform it».93 This concept became a 
rallying point to which it was easy to attract students with traditional backgrounds from the 
countryside who may have felt alienated moving to urban areas.94 There is also reason to believe 
that it also appealed to students from the lower middle classes and as those originating in the 
popular (sha´bī) areas of the bigger cities – the other stratum that JI drew its recruits from. 
For some, among them Mawdudi, the concept of tawhīd also leads to a belief in the 
exclusiveness of Islam compared with other religions.95 Hence, by implication, other religions and 
philosophies – even Christianity and Judaism, although both commonly regarded as monotheistic 
religions – are not reliable as sources of guidance for humans' lives due to the belief in multiple 
divines.96 This view appears to have struck a cord with the students that later made up the radical 
wing of JI, which viewed the Copts as their biggest enemies, a subject I will return to in chapter 
four.
Mawdudi's party, Jamaat-e islami, inspired the Islamist students to change their name from 
al-Jamā´a al-Dīniyya to al-Jamā´a al-`Islāmiyya, according to `Abū al-Futūḥ, who allegedly was 
one of those deciding the name.97 The decision was spontaneous, however, and there is a lack of 
consensus concerning why the name was chosen. A prominent member such as ´Iṣām al-´Aryān 
recalls that the name was chosen simply because it was the name that suited the group’s activities  
best.98 Salāḥ Hāshim on the other hand, one of the JI founders in `Asyūṭ in Upper Egypt, also 
emphasises the importance of Mawdudi in deciding the name.99  
Regardless of who is right, there is little doubt that Mawdudi's thoughts had an impact on the 
90 Glassé, The Concise Encyclopædia of Islam, 300.
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94 Tønnessen, «Egyptiske studenter mellom Marx og Muhammad», 84.
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young students in JI. His books for instance, were among the first printed when JI won the student 
elections to the Arts Committee at the Faculty of Medicine in Qaṣr al-´Aynī in 1973 and 
subsequently gained control of publishing funds.100 
Quṭb's Clout and the Interpretation of Ḥisba
One of the questions most heavily debated regarding JI, is the reach of the Egyptian ideologue 
Sayyid Quṭb (1906-1966), a member of the Muslim Brotherhood who was eventually executed by 
the Nasserist regime in 1966. 
In his most renowned work, Ma´ālim fī al-Ṭarīq (Milestones) Quṭb championed reorganising 
the society in line with how the Prophet and his Companions lived.101 This, in turn, demanded a 
merger of politics and religion.102 The only source of guidance for this society is the Koran, Quṭb 
advocates, referring to a Ḥadīth where the Prophet Muḥammad is displeased with ´Umar when he 
brings along some pages from the Jewish Torah.103 This emphasises that the first generation of 
Muslims were not inspired by any other cultures or other sources than that of the Koran. 
Hence, Quṭb's goal was a return to the society of the first generation of Muslims. The 
obstacle to the return, was the society of jāhiliyya, a concept first introduced in its modern form by 
Mawdudi and applied to states and societies not governed by the Sharia laws, above all self-
proclaimed Muslim states.104   
Quṭb however, developed the concept of jāhiliyya further. In his view the state of jāhiliyya is 
«based on a rebellion against God's sovereignty on earth».105 The rebellion consists of peoples' 
failure to accept the oneness of God and to submit only to His sovereignty. In today's society the 
rulers are making a mistake by demanding a loyalty which is only to be given to God alone.106 In 
turn, the subjects are wrong to submit to the demands of the rulers – the submission is for God 
alone, «humans must take the rules and laws from no other than Allah».107 Because Islam, says 
Quṭb, «is not merely belief (...) Islam is the freedom of man from servitude to other men».108 
According to Quṭb, the jāhiliyya society is as deep-rooted today as at the time of Islam's 
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arrival, if not deeper.109 Even Muslim societies of today were jāhilī, «not because they believed in 
other deities besides God or because they worship any other than God, but because their life is not 
based on submission to God alone»110. 
These lines underscores Quṭb's belief that it is not simply enough to be a devout Muslim on 
a personal level as long as one lives and abides by the rules in a society that is not governed only by 
the laws of God – the Sharia. It is impossible for a true Muslim to submit to any other power than 
God's. Or, as Bergesen illustrates, obeying the law in a democracy for instance, is equivalent to 
denying God.111 
The way to return to the ideal society is by way of jihād. Although Quṭb refers to a Koranic 
verse (sūra) that says «There is no compulsion in religion» and also stressing that «The Islamic 
Jihad has no relationship to modern warfare, either in its causes or in the way in which it is 
conducted», there is little doubt Quṭb saw a need for some kind of violent struggle to rid the world 
of the state of jāhiliyya.112
Notwithstanding the apparent clear-cut words, it should be noted that he himself was never 
explicit about whether his jāhiliyya should be interpreted as a «clean break» or merely as a 
«spiritual abstraction».113 
As we in this chapter are mostly concerned with the influence in the initial period of JI – it is 
also worth taking a brief look at other parts of Quṭb's literature. It is not given that only Milestones 
alone influenced JI; two of his works – Hadhā al-Dīn and Al-Mustaqbal li-Hadhā al-Dīn – were for 
example among the first published in the JI series «Ṣawt al-ḥaqq» in 1973 and not Milestones.114
In an university environment in the first half of the 1970s, dominated by westernised and 
secular leftists, it must have been a relief for a devout Muslim youth to read the words of Quṭb, 
stressing that «we have not a single reason to make any separation between Islam and society (...) 
such reasons as there are attach only to European Christianity», and furthermore, «we have no good 
grounds for any hostility between the thought of social justice, such as the hostility that persists 
between Christianity and Communism».115 
Social justice and a (certain) redistribution of wealth are already prescribed by Islam, Quṭb 
claims. There is reason to believe that these opinions went down well with students fresh from the 
countryside and popular neighbourhoods in the cities who where brought up to believe in Islam as a 
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complete system fit for all aspects of society and life. What is more, Quṭb's emphasis on Islam's 
superiority compared with both Western Christianity and Communism must have been well 
received by many on campus at a time when Nasserist socialism had proved to fail; Egypt had been 
routed by Israel in the Six Day War of 1967 and the Sadat regime were looking to revive itself in an 
ever more Islamic cloak.
Nevertheless, how much Quṭb influenced the young students of JI is a cause for some 
debate. Milestones had enormous impact on what was published by JI, according to Kepel, who 
claims that «Quṭb's name crops up repeatedly in the mimeographed leaflets and newsletters 
produced by the jama'at rank and file, and the young militants claimed allegiance to his memory». 116 
In contrast, he says, the works of Ḥasan al-Huḍaybī – the former Supreme Guide of the Muslim 
Brotherhood – was «virtually ignored».117 
Roel Meijer paints more or less the same picture in his review of the key influences of JI and 
points to the emerging importance of Quṭb: «...by the mid 1970s the Jama‘at had adopted such 
potentially revolutionary concepts as jāhiliyya (period of ignorance) and hakimiyya (sovereignty of 
God as opposed to the sovereignty of man) from Sayyid Qutb».118 Hamied Ansari also describes his 
writings as an inspiration for the movement, especially the radical wings.119
There is no doubt that Quṭb was widely read among the members of JI – as mentioned 
above, his books was among the first printed by JI.  Furthermore, his call for a society based purely 
on the Koran and the first generation of Muslims also appealed a great deal to the young Islamist 
students, who longed for what had been before the founding of the modern state: «From our point of 
view, setting up a state meant a return to the Islamic Caliphate (...) Our 'dream state' was a Sharia 
state based on ḥudūd», `Abu al-Futūḥ recalls.120 Obstacles like disagreements regarding fiqh 
(Islamic jurisprudence) was not considered. The organisations of the Egyptian state was looked 
upon as a department from the spirit of Islam and subsequently had to be abandoned for an Islamic 
substitute.
These thoughts are not far from the ideas of Quṭb. Moreover, in the first half of the 1970s, 
JI's view upon violence as a means for change was far more double-edged than it eventually 
became. Judging by the memoirs of `Abu al-Futūḥ, there was, even among those who considered 
themselves moderates, an acceptance of violence: «Not only did we believe in the authorization of  
the use of violence, in some cases (we saw it as) imperative for the sake of spreading our call and 
116 Kepel, Muslim Extremism in Egypt, 155.
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the rise of our idea. To us, violence was not only legitimate, it was also justified».121
These views are to a great extent affected by the medieval ´ālim (Islamic scholar) `Ibn 
Taymiyya, who, claims Meijer, was JI's primary source when it came to the organisation's view of 
the central principle of ḥisba (al-`amr bi l-ma´rūf wa al-nahī ´an al-munkar – command that which 
is just and forbid that which is evil).122 
Ḥisba is described as the «greatest pole of religion» by the important Islamic philosopher 
and theologian `Abū Ḥāmid Muḥammad al-Ghazālī (1058-1111). It is the essence of all religion, he 
says, and its neglect will lead to the downfall of religion and in turn corruption and ignorance.123 
Despite its prominence, it is not treated as part of the Sharia in the sense that its neglect carries any 
legal sanctions, Kamali notes: «It is instead treated as a normative principle of Islam which provides 
moral argument and the foundation for the bulk of the detailed rules of the applied Sharia in its 
various branches».124 
The duality of Ḥisba, as both a right and a duty, has been widely debated in Islam. For the 
concern of this thesis, however, it suffices to underline that this discussion also took place within JI. 
Meijer notes that certain elements of JI not only emphasised the duty part of Ḥisba, but also 
embraced `Ibn Taymiyya's argument that it is right in certain situations to use force to exercise it  
(i.e. forbid that which is evil) – without the state sanctioning it.125 Meijer's view is to a certain extent 
backed by Māḍī, who recalls that the violence-embracing wing of JI defended its actions with this 
interpretation of Ḥisba.126 
Mawdudi also stressed that it is not enough to simply utter al-shahāda, one must also strive 
to enforce Islamic moral order in the society.127 How this struggle was to be brought about was the 
concern for great debate within JI all along. However, in the early years the debate seems to have 
evolved around the timing of the use of violence rather than if violence in itself was acceptable.  
Although the violent trend was not clear, there was a feeling among some for the need of changing 
the munkar (evil) by power.128 In the first period munkar was attributed more to social wrongs, for 
instance boys and girls walking together on the street, than it was to the regime. Nevertheless, with 
time, this changed and the same people also heralded the need for political change by force, says 
Madī. 
For the moderates of the organisation, the use of violence was limited to fistfights with 
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leftist students on campus. Some Islamists also tore down posters and broke up the meetings of their 
opponents.129 More radical students on the other hand, went more than one step further;  two JI 
members were given prison terms in the trial in the wake of the attack on the Technical Military 
Academy (al-Kulliyya al-Fanniyya al-´Askariyya) in April 1974.130 Despite the fact that none of the 
two convicted held any central positions in JI, it is nevertheless proof of a violent current within the 
movement at the time, however minor it may have been.
And, despite refusing any contact with such organisations as al-Fanniyya al-´Askariyya (the 
name attributed to Munaẓẓamat al-Taḥrīr al-`Islāmī that attempted a coup by attacking the Technical  
Military Academy) and Jamā´at al-Muslimīn (known in the press at the time and afterwards as al-
Takfīr wa al-Hijra), the idea of use of force revolved around timing rather than the use of force 
itself.131 While some members demanded a violent change as quickly as possible – apparently a 
minority as JI did not take part in any serious violence until later – others did not see the time fit for  
a violent uprising. The thought of a violent take-over of power however, was not outright 
condemned.   
Salafism and the Power of Symbols
Apart from Meijer's remarks that «most (JI) members were simply pious and endeavoured to follow 
a 'traditional Salafism'» the Salafi influence on JI is rarely commented on by authorities on the field.
132 At least if one compares it with how many times the name of for instance Sayyid Quṭb is 
mentioned when it comes to sources of inspiration.
This may be due to Salafism being first and foremost an influence in JIs early years; come 
the late 1970s the movement had become more politicised and Salafism had lost its dominating role.  
Salafism was nevertheless an important source of inspiration for JI at the time the organisation was 
founded.133 
Salafism is not an easily explained. First of all it should be noted that the Salafism that is  
referred to here, is not that which is commonly attributed to the reformers Jamāl al-Dīn al-`Afghānī  
and Muḥammad ´Abduh and their followers, who in the in the second half of the 19th century called 
for a return to the basic principles of Islam as an answer to the hegemony of Western ideas. This 
movement was basically a progressive movement, as I accounted for in chapter one.
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The Salafism that inspired the students of JI is quite the converse of that preached by al-
`Afghānī and ´Abduh. This version of Salafism also points back to the al-Salaf al-Ṣāliḥ (the 
venerable forefathers), the first three generations of Muslims.134 Yet, for these Salafists the point is 
to read the Koran and the Traditions (Aḥādīth) in their most literal, traditional sense. As implied 
above, `Ibn Taymiyya was a great source of influence in that respect. The real fundamentalists of 
Islam were the Salafists, Kepel says and points to their hostility to «any and all innovation, which 
they condemned as mere human interpretation».135 Hence, most Salafists has distaste for man-made 
concepts and institutions such as government and politics.136 Clothes, prayer and personal piety are 
on the other hand of the utmost importance.137 
Some of the founding members of JI in Cairo attended the lectures of the shuyūkh of Jamā
´at `Anṣār al-Sunna al-Muḥammadiyya.138 This was a group founded in 1926, and although most of 
its members were ´ulamā` from al-`Azhar, it has been strongly linked to Salafism.139 In their 
monthly magazine al-Tawhīd the group called for the implementation of the Sharia by the 
government. Apart from that demand `Anṣār al-Sunna al-Muḥammadiyya held all other aspects of 
politics in disregard. 
It is not difficult to spot how the influence of Salafism on JI played out in practice in the 
early years. First, it was compulsory for men to grow of a beard.140 Second, wearing the white 
jallabiyya also became a common feature among male students.141 Females on the other hand, had 
to wear Islamic garments – long robes, veil and gloves – if they wanted to use JIs bus service in 
Cairo, according to Kepel. Once the Islamist students had entered the student union, part of the 
union's budget was for instance used to buy ḥijābs that were distributed among female students.142 
At a later point, they were encouraging women to wear niqābs that did not show any skin at all.143 
These niqābs were soon spread among the female students too, and were referred to by president 
Sadat as «tents».
Additionally, the separation of the sexes was tremendously important. Kepel points to JIs 
successful campaign for the separation of women and men at university lectures.144 Furthermore, it 
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was forbidden for a JI member to speak to a female student, even if the conversation was about 
Islam. This was one of the differences between JI and another Islamist organisation on campus, 
Jamā´at Shabāb al-`Islām, according to `Abū al-Futūḥ, who recalls that «because the spirit of 
conservative Salafism had got the better of us, we adopted a hard-line stance in everything that 
concerned women».145 The JI members regarded the separation between male and female students 
as an achievement they were responsible for. 
For those most heavily influenced by Salafism and Wahabbism, the fight for separation 
reached the point where they were calling for the separation of boys and girls in primary school in 
addition to men-only hospitals run by men and women-only hospitals run by women.146 
Moreover, it appears to have been hostility towards art, theatre and music among JI 
members, not an uncommon feature among Salafists. The aforementioned election to the Arts 
Committee of the Medicine Faculty in Qaṣr al-´Aynī was entered with a view to stop the evil (`iqāf  
al-munkar) and not at all out of interest for art, which was considered the «work of Satan» (´aml al-
shayṭān).147 
Former leading members of JI also express that in the beginning the important thing was to 
see to that people lived their lives in accordance with the teachings of the Koran and the Traditions.
148 The students met each other through a need for a more religious life on campus and started 
preaching and missionary work (al-da´wa) among the other students. They were not joined by 
common political goals, but rather the concern for the individual's morals and beliefs. These 
attitudes are in line with Salafism where the focus on appearance and a pious life eclipses other 
matters and politics is not of great importance. 
In addition to the students' want of a campus more in line with Islam's teachings (as they 
saw them), external factors also helped to blow the Salafi wind over campus in the early 1970s. 
That Salafism had a hold on the students in the first part of the decade is no coincidence if one looks 
at what happened in Egyptian politics at the time. 
President Anwar Sadat's wish to rid Egypt of Nasser's heritage – Nasserism – lead to a shift 
in the country's foreign policy. While Nasser had aligned himself more and more with the Soviet 
Union in the 1960s, Sadat sought to strengthen Egypt's ties with the West and the US instead. The 
program of «de-Nasserisation» lead to a closer relationship with Saudi Arabia, which in the age of 
Nasser was considered an arch enemy. With Sadat's new orientation, a Cairo-Riyadh axis developed 
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which was to last until 1977.149  As a result of the tightened relations, Egypt became more 
financially dependent on the oil kingdom and the Saudis also gained influence due to a more 
conservative elite being consolidated in Cairo.150  
The oil embargo that Saudi Arabia initiated as a reaction to the October War between Egypt 
and Israel of 1973, pushed the Wahhabi kingdom's prestige in the region to new heights.151 The war, 
also known as the «Ramadan War», was seen as an Islamic victory and strengthened the contact 
between the two countries even more. The closer ties with Saudi Arabia not only lead to numerous 
Egyptians crossing the Red Sea to work in the Saudi oil sector, it also resulted in funds being made 
available to religious groups in Egypt in order to stimulate a religious revival, along with a flow of 
Salafist books. As of the early 1970s, these free books arrived in Egypt by the thousands and 
heavily impressed and influenced the members of JI.152 
The Egyptian oil workers also brought back with them a more strict and conservative 
version of Islam, which also contributed to the growing Islamisation of Egypt at the time, resulting 
for instance in more girls and women taking the veil.153
 
The Brotherhood: Slowly Awakening
What separated the Brotherhood from the other sources of influence dealt with above, is of course 
that it is an organisation with a vast membership and not a thinker or an ideologue.154 Therefore, it is 
important to define the Brotherhood which I will be referring to in the coming paragraphs. 
 For the purpose of this thesis, the most fruitful is to look at the ideas of the founder of the 
Brotherhood, Ḥasan al-Bannā which were carried on by his successors, Ḥasan al-Huḍaybī and 
´Umar al-Tilmisānī. After all, these ideas were crucial to what happened within JI from the middle 
of the 1970s an onwards, as we shall see in the next chapter. 
The aim of Ḥasan al-Bannā, was an Islamic state governed by Sharia, for, as he says: «We 
believe that Islam is a complete concept which regulates all aspects of life».155 Al-Bannā advocated 
a gradual Islamisation of society through a bottom-up process beginning with the individual, then 
the family and consequently society.156 The way to conduct this process was solely based on mission 
149 Dessouki, «The Resurgence of Islamic Organisations in Egypt: An Interpretation», 115.
150 Hinnebusch, Egyptian Politics Under Sadat, 47. 
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152 `Abū al-Futūḥ, Shāhid ´alā tārīkh al-ḥaraka al-ìslāmiyya fī miṣr 1970-1984, 65.
153 Tønnessen, «Egyptiske studenter mellom Marx og Muhammad», 59.
154 See the introduction to part II of this chapter concerning the reason for dealing with Sayyid Quṭb separately from the 
Brotherhood. 
155 Ḥasan al-Bannā, Majmū´a rasā `il al-`imām al-shahīd Ḥasan al-Bannā  (Cairo: Dār al-Shihāb), 16. My translation.
156 Israel Elad Altman, «Strategies of the Muslim Brotherhood Movement 1928-2007», Research Monographs on the  
Muslim World Series No 2, Paper No 2 (January 2009), 9. 
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(al-da´wa) and education. Only after the society had embraced the Brotherhood's ideas would it be 
in a position to start implementing the Islamic state.  
While underlining the importance of peaceful mission, al-Bannā at the same time glorified 
martyrdom and spoke of jihād as a duty compulsory for every Muslim.157 His emphasis on jihād is 
however linked with Muslims being ruled by infidel foreigners rather than any notion of ridding the 
lands of Islam of jāhiliyya, like Quṭb advocated.158 Apart from the killing of Prime Minister 
Nuqrāshī Bāshā in 1948, the violence conducted by the Muslim Brotherhood was mostly restricted 
to external enemies, such as the British in the Suez Canal zone or against the infant Israeli state in  
the war in the former Palestine Mandate in 1948-49. The assassination attempt on president Nasser 
in 1954 is often ascribed the Brotherhood, although it is unclear to what extent this was planned or 
given the green light by the organisation's leaders. 
Since Brotherhood members were subjected to harsh repression and long terms in jail in the 
reign of Nasser, the organisation emerged from prisons and exiles «a seemingly broken, tamed, and 
aged remnant of the past».159 Its members were cautious not to confront the Sadat regime that had 
released them from captivity and kept their heads low for the first part of the decade. 
Therefore, opinions differ about how influential their role was in the initiation of JI.160 
Hisham Mubarak claims that the religious groups, al-Jamā´āt al-Dīniyya, came into being on the 
campuses without influence from the Brotherhood or more radical islamist groups.161 The young 
students lacked older role models, he says, because the Islamist movement in general was in a 
vacuum in the early 1970s. 
Meijer supports his view, claiming that the different jamā´āt were established independently 
of each other – a view supported by most scholars and former members – and without any ties to 
the Brotherhood.162 
Tønnessen on the other hand, underlines the Brotherhood's vital role as influence for the 
young students from the very beginning. Among others he refers to ´Iṣām al-´Aryān, one of the JI 
leaders based in Cairo, who underlines the history and writings of the Brotherhood as an early 
source of inspiration.163 The Brotherhood was also essential in establishing JI in `Asyūṭ in Upper 
Egypt, he argues.164
There is no doubt the students at the Cairo University's Medical Faculty in Qaṣr al-´Aynī got 
157 al-Bannā, Majmū´a rasā `il al-`imām al-shahīd Ḥasan al-Bannā , 248.
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161 Tønnessen, «Egyptiske studenter mellom Marx og Muhammad», 56.
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in touch with religious doctors and members of the Muslim Brotherhood in the early 1970s and that 
these meetings had an impact on the students. `Abū al-Futūḥ mentions both the Brotherhood-
affiliated Yūsuf al-Qaraḍāwī – whom he describes as a moderate – as an Islamic author who were 
widely read, as well as attending lectures by the shuyūkh of al-Jama´iyya al-Shar´iyya.165 This group 
can be traced back to the last decade of the 19th century and was initially apolitical.166 Al-Jam´iyya 
al-Shar´iyya was also a source to the Salafist influence on JI, yet, at the time the pioneers of JI got 
in touch with it, some of the above-mentioned shuyūkh held views not far from the Muslim 
Brotherhood.167 At the same time, al-Bannā's concept of Islamising the society from the bottom and 
up, was an approach many JI members made their own.
However, indications that the Muslim Brotherhood's impact was somewhat limited in the 
beginning compared with the later years, can not be overseen. 
Firstly, there was an influx of Salafist literature from Saudi Arabia at the time – which I have 
accounted for – that swamped the universities. Brotherhood members may have been released from 
jail in the early 1970s, but their books were still banned and hard to come across.168 Thus, Salafism's 
gain was in many ways the Brotherhood's loss.
Secondly, a certain scepticism existed among some JI members towards the Brotherhood, 
which in turn explains why many of those who joined the `Ikhwān chose to keep their membership 
secret for a long time.169 The reason behind the scepticism – and in some cases hostility – was the 
notion that the Muslim Brotherhood was a weak organisation. This view was dominant among the 
radical factions of JI, as Ansari explains, and founded on the belief that the three decades long 
crackdown on the Brotherhood's leaders – a majority of them belonging to an older generation – 
had made them willing to «compromise true beliefs in order to win some favours from the political 
authority».170 
Even among those who cannot be described as radicals, wariness existed towards the 
Brotherhood when its leadership emerged from prison in 1974. Apart from seeing themselves as the 
future leaders of the Islamist movement in Egypt whereas the older Brotherhood leaders belonged 
to history, the brothers' lack of Salafi sentiment – they did not grow long beards for example – 
caused caution among JI members.171 
Besides, one must not forget the huge difference between the two organisations at the time. 
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`Abū al-Futūḥ's story about the astonishment of the old Brotherhood member Muḥammad ´Abd al-
Mu´ṭī al-Jazār when he sees an Islamist demonstration after being released from prison, illustrates 
this difference.172 The level of Islamic activism was unbelievable for a man who was told in prison 
that there were no religious persons on the outside and no veiled women. Therefore, while the 
young leadership of JI was determined to fight (some of them with violent means) for the 
implementation of the Sharia and the founding of an Islamic state, the brothers who newly had 
regained their freedom had a quite different perspective. 
For them, the immediate objective was to survive as an organisation. At the same time, the 
young members of JI were having fistfights with the Communist students on campus. This 
expression of ḥass jihādī (jihadist sentiment) may help to explain why Sayyid Quṭb allegedly was 
more popular among the JI students in the first part of the decade than the Brotherhood supreme 
guide Ḥasan al-Huḍaybī.173
Conclusion
In this chapter I have showed that the defeat in the Six Day War in 1967 provided the Islamists with 
an opportunity to point out the flaws of the Nasserist system, and that there is good reason to 
believe that their call to return to Islam had some appeal among the Egyptian population. 
I have also discussed the regime's role in the rise of the Islamist movement on campus in the 
early 1970s. That president Sadat contributed to an Islamisation of the society is beyond doubt. 
Although the sources on this matter vary in their credibility, little material supports theories of Sadat  
as the sole creator of movements such as JI. He saw them as pivotal in his struggle against leftist 
elements, but as later events proves, Sadat was never able to control them. 
With regard to the different Islamic sources influencing JI at the time it emerged, what the 
preceding pages have done first and foremost, is to underline the diversity. There are nevertheless 
some common features, like the call for an Islamic state governed by the Sharia and Islam as a 
complete system for society – tawḥīd. 
The Muslim Brotherhood as an Islamist organisation was undoubtedly important for the 
young students that founded JI. But, as I have shown, there was widespread scepticism towards the 
Brotherhood at the time, and I think it is right to say that JI was heavier influenced ideologically by 
Salafism in the early years. There are two reasons for this. First, you had the flow of Salafist 
172 `Abū al-Futūḥ, Shāhid ´alā tārīkh al-ḥaraka al-ìslāmiyya fī miṣr 1970-1984, 74.
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literature from Saudi Arabia at the time, and, second, the focus on appearance and religious rituals  
was easy to rally around. Kepel touches upon this when he claims that JI was more concerned with 
action slogans than the ideological basis of their faith.174 
In spite of the exaggerated focus on Sayyid Quṭb by some scholars, there is no doubt that his 
books and fate as a shāhid (martyr) played an important role for the JI members – both to the ones 
who supported the use of violence and to the ones who appeared more hesitant on that field. 
As I pointed out, even students that belonged firmly in the moderate camp spoke of their 
Jihadist spirit and did not outright condemn violence as a means for change. However, Quṭb's 
legacy turned out to be more of a source for division than unification within JI, as we shall se in the 
next chapters. 
174 Kepel, Muslim Extremism in Egypt, 152.
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Chapter III: The Road towards the Brotherhood
This chapter will deal with how a number of the figureheads of JI came to be affiliated with the 
Muslim Brotherhood. However, before embarking on the affiliation process itself, I find it important 
to establish the nature of both JI and the Brotherhood in the mid 1970s. 
Therefore, the first part of the chapter will be spent explaining how JI managed to Islamise 
campus and become the dominant force among Egyptian students in the 1970s. I will keep this part 
of the chapter fairly brief, as this is widely covered by Tønnessen in his thesis. 
In the second part I will first discuss the Brotherhood's historical ambivalence towards the 
use of violence as a political tool. The reason for dealing with this question in depth, is because the 
view on violence was perhaps the main obstacle to JI joining the Brotherhood. Furthermore, it will 
highlight the internal divisions inside the Brotherhood when the contact with JI emerged. These 
factions, and their ideological connection with the likes of Sayyid Quṭb, actually played a crucial  
role in the process of winning over the majority of the JI leadership, as I will demonstrate.
Before I arrive at the actual affiliation process, I will address the Brotherhood's motives for 
inviting the students into the organisation. Here, the purpose is showing how the young generation 
of Islamists, when it joined, revitalised the `Ikhwān who was a movement with a broken back when 
its members were released from prison in the first years of the decade. 
The last part will deal with how a number of leading figures of JI became members of the 
Brotherhood. Here, the aim is to demonstrate the developments inside JI in regard to violence.   
  
 
Part 1
Students played a central part in the demonstrations in the aftermath of the defeat in the June War in 
1967. The uprising persuaded President Nasser to grant students the right to form independent 
groups on the universities through decree 1533 of 1968. The decree established the General Union 
of Egyptian Students, a body which actually obtained a certain autonomy, contrary to earlier student 
organisations during Nasser's regime.175 Moreover, the power of the University Guard, a sort of 
security force based on campus, was at the same time decreased.176 
When the students engaged in new protests in November the same year, the regime tightened 
the rope and cut back on the students' new-won liberties. The backtracking encouraged the students 
175 Wickham, Mobilizing Islam, 116.
176 Tønnessen, «Egyptiske studenter mellom Marx og Muhammad», 39.
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to detach themselves from the regime, and thus the foundation for a more independent student 
movement was laid.
Islamist students were far and few between on campus at this point, however. They were not 
in the forefront of neither the 1968 demonstrations nor the uprising in 1972. However, when 
demonstrations broke out again the next year, the presence of Islamists students were stronger. 
In the five years that followed, JI succeeded in a number of student elections, finally gaining 
control over the General Union's national board by landslide victories in the academic year of 1978-
79. On the following pages I will point to the various reasons behind JI's ascend to power. 
Happy Campers
The Islamic summer camps played a vital role in the schooling of young religious students. There 
had been religious summer camps during Nasser's reign as well, but they served the interests of the 
regime, implementing the regime's official views.177 The camps that were organised by JI in the 
1970s on the other hand, were modelled after the Brotherhood camps held in the 1950s.178 
In the summer of 1973, Islamist students at the University of Cairo were able to organise 
their own camp independently of the regime. The camp was also open to students from the 
University of ´Ayn Shams, situated in the north-eastern suburbs of Cairo. The next year, Egypt's 
biggest newspaper, al-`Ahām, reported from the final days of the camp where about five hundred 
students attended along with the first secretary of the Government party who praised the project.179 
The following year similar camps were organised in both the Delta city of al-Manṣūra and Banī 
Swayf in Upper Egypt.
Prominent shuyūkh and Islamist leaders were often invited to speak at these camps, thus 
providing the students with valuable schooling in Islamic issues.180 The camps also gave the 
participants a taste of «Islamic utopia», Kepel remarks.181 They functioned as a model for the 
society  that the young students had in mind for the future. 
The camps had yet another role, which proved valuable for the expansion of JI. According to 
`Abū al-Futūḥ, this was the place where a kind of organisational leadership formed.182 In their 
heydays the camps drew thousands of participants and big names as Shaykh Muḥammad al-Ghazālī 
and Shaykh Yusūf al-Qaraḍāwī. `Abū al-Futūḥ also emphasises the tremendous importance of the 
177 Tønnessen, «Egyptiske studenter mellom Marx og Muhammad», 51.
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camps as a place for da´wa (mission) and recruitment of new members .
The Art of Propaganda
In chapter two I pointed out that JI was quick to publish Islamic literature when they gained control 
over the Arts Committee at the Faculty of Medicine in Qaṣr al-´Aynī in 1973. On the whole, JI 
proved a modern force in their methods of communicating their message. 
In 1975,  JI also achieved control of the information and publishing committee at the 
Student Union's national level. JI soon initiated their collection of Islamic literature called Sawt al-
Haqq, (Voice of the Truth) which was produced at low cost and distributed among the students.183 In 
addition to renowned Islamic ideologues, like Quṭb and Mawdudi, JI also published their own 
statements containing either clarifications of their own ideology or opinions on current issues.184 
In addition to that, JI also distributed cassettes where the lectures of prominent shuyūkh were 
recorded. These shuyūkh were also invited to hold lectures on campus. JI also organised special 
«weeks» attributed to certain issues related to Islam.
Tønnessen points out that these activities had to functions; first, they educated the young 
students and enabled them to perform da´wa (mission) themselves.185 Second, these activities 
attracted new recruits. A quick look at some of JI's slogans at the time – «To God, Egypt!», 
«Together for the sake of Sharia!», «Together against apostasy and pornography» – reveals their 
inclusive and quite uncontroversial nature.186 Thus, these slogans must have appealed to a wide 
range of students. 
Recruitment through Services
The third area where JI made an obvious difference for the students was on campus. Due to the 
explosive growth in the number of students from the 1960s an onwards, the universities were 
overcrowded and student services near non-existent: The lecture halls were overcrowded, the 
accommodation sparse and expensive private lessons imperative if one was to pass the exams.187  
In principle, university studies was free of charge in Egypt – a system introduced by Nasser 
in order to make higher education possible for the lower classes. In reality however, background 
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and economic sources still played a pivotal role. For instance, the jam-packed auditoriums made it  
extremely difficult for the students to comprehend the all details of the lectures. When exams 
consisted of parroting the lectures word for word, underpaid teachers saw an opportunity to earn an 
extra income through private lessons. 
The malfunctions of the system contributed to the maintain a system where the ones with 
wealthy backgrounds and contacts succeeded, while the ones from poor or middle class families fell 
through – exactly what the Nasserist system meant to counter.
JI thrived on their ability to identify the students' everyday worries and annoyances. Once in 
power of the Student Union, JI started copying manuals sold by the teachers and distributing them 
among the students.188 In regard to the overcrowding the students faced on their way to the 
university, JI solved the problem by providing their own bus service. JI also pushed for the building 
or expanding of mosques on campus. A fourth service they provided was cheap tours to Saudi 
Arabia which enabled cash-strapped students to conduct their pilgrimage.189 
On top of that, JI began offering female students cheap Islamic clothes. The influx of women 
at the universities – between the ratio of female to male students went from 1:12 to 1:2 – allegedly 
increased the sexual tension on campus and conservative dress was a way to imply asexuality and 
unavailability.190 
 The majority of the students living in the university dormitories were poor or came from 
families far away. The standard of the dormitories however, was often very low, and two or three 
students had to share one room.191
JI responded to the material needs of the students, whereas the left wing students focused on 
issues of foreign politics such as the plight of the Palestinians or the growing unrest in Lebanon.192 
Thus, JI's activism can both be seen as an effort to create a more just society, in line with Islamic 
tradition, and an effective means to draw support on campus, as Tønnessen suggests. Their 
recruitment strategy must be considered a success, even non-religious students admitted going to 
their meetings, allegedly because the Islamists were the only ones «doing something».193 
A Landslide of Victories 
In 1976 Sadat introduced what was supposed to be a multiparty system in Egypt. In practice it 
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meant creating three «platforms» (manābir) within the ruling The Arab Socialist Union, one to the 
left, one to the left and one in the centre of the political landscape.194 Sadat placed himself among 
the centrists in the Egypt Party (Ḥizb Miṣr), which two years later was renamed The National 
Democratic Party (al-Ḥizb al-Waṭanī al-Dīmūqrāṭī). 
The political liberalisation also benefited the students. Through decree 335/1976 the 
leadership of the National Student Union became independent and its twelve members were now to 
be elected by the students, not selected by the government.
Before the liberalisation, JI had managed to win elections to certain committees in some 
faculties. The student elections to the academic year of 1976-77 saw a change in fortunes for JI. 
`Abū al-Futūḥ was elected leader of the student union at the University of Cairo, Māḍī obtained the 
same position at the University of al-Minyā, while JI also won a number of other important 
positions. `Abū al-Futūḥ described the sweeping victories as the university «announcing its return 
to its origins».195
 The subsequent year, Māḍī was elected vice president for the National Student Union. ´Iṣām 
al-´Aryān won the leadership of the union at the Faculty of Medicine at the University of Cairo, 
whereas `Ibrāhīm al-Za‘farānī obtained the same position at the University of Alexandria. On the 
whole, JI won a sweeping victory capturing a majority on eight out of twelve universities in Egypt. 
The JI domination continued until 1979 when the statues of student elections were altered and 
student democracy circumscribed.  
What is interesting is that JI did considerably better in the elections from the time they 
started opposing President Sadat, especially his peace initiative towards Israel, but also the effects 
of Infitāḥ, the economic open door policy. This may be explained by the fact that the peace initiative 
was equally unpopular among Islamist and leftist students. Moreover, as the public debt 
skyrocketed towards the end of the 1970s, the outlook for governments jobs, for many students the 
purpose of their education, became ever more gloomy. 
It is also noteworthy that almost all the JI leaders that succeeded in the elections belonged to 
universities in either Cairo or Alexandria. The exception is Māḍī, who studied at the University of 
al-Minyā. Not surprisingly, all of the politically active students belonged to the moderate wing of JI.
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Part 2
This part will treat the Muslim Brotherhood, its history with the Sadat regime, violence, the 
advances towards JI leaders and the young students' eventual affiliation with the `Ikhwān.  
The Brotherhood's view upon violence have been ambivalent up through the years and 
factions within the movement still looked at violence as a possible way to power, at least in theory,  
at the time the Brotherhood approached JI. This actually benefited the movement in their efforts to  
win over the students. 
With regard to JI's initial affiliation with the Brotherhood, it is important to have in mind 
that were are only talking about in the excess of a dozen of JI leaders and prominent members, not 
the loosely organised Islamist student movement as a whole.
These figures were nonetheless the driving forces in the movement and did in turn influence 
the other students' attitude towards the Brotherhood in their respective universities.  
The Brotherhood and Violence
Traditionally, the The Muslim Brotherhood has been eager to emphasise its peaceful nature, 
stressing that their ultimate wish is to live under a rule which applies the Sharia correctly, rather  
than take power themselves.196 The founder, Ḥasan al-Bannā, is himself widely portrayed as the 
traditional moderate face of the Brotherhood; the pious man non-violently pursuing the aim of an 
Islamist state.    
The history of the Brotherhood's and violence is not so uncomplicated, though. I have in the 
preceding chapter pointed out the founder al-Bannā's emphasis on jihād, and according to Lia, the 
Brotherhood paid far greater attention to both the violent and the non-violent interpretation of it at  
the organisation's initiation than was normal at the time.197 However, it is important to note that al-
Bannā put far more emphasis on the struggle against what he perceived as the West's colonialism in 
the lands of Islam. In other words, al-Bannā did not call for jihād in order to overthrow the king or 
the Egyptian government. 
However, al-Bannā himself never managed to – or was willing to – stamp out violent groups 
within the movement, such as al-Niẓām al-Khāṣṣ  (The Special System).198 This group was 
responsible for attacks against British forces in the Suez Canal zone and from the 1940s and 
onwards, assassinations of Egyptian politicians, most notably the killing of Prime Minister Maḥmūd 
196 Alison Pargeter, The Muslim Brotherhood: The Burden of Tradition (London: Saqi Books, 2010), 179-80.
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Fahmī al-Nuqrāshī Bāshā in 1948. Al-Bannā distanced himself from the assassination and 
denounced perpetrators of violence as «neither Brothers» nor «Muslims», though it did not go down 
well with some his followers.199 The assassin himself – initially unwilling to speak to the police – 
was so disappointed with his leader that he started a chain of confessions that gave up his 
accomplices.200
This indicates that violence was far from alien to the Brotherhood under the leadership of al-
Bannā. He was, as Pargeter puts it, «never able to reconcile his desire to adopt a cautious approach 
with his bid to be seen as defending Islam and capable of mounting a challenge to the established 
order».201 And, although one must also take into account the turbulent and chaotic times in pre-
revolutionary Egypt where the Ikhwān were far from the only ones resorting to violence, it is 
evidence of a mindset that survived into the 1970s, as we shall see later on.
The man that succeeded al-Bannā as the Brotherhood's General Guide (al-murshid al-´ām), 
Has an al-Huḍaybī, took over the reigns at a difficult time. The assassination of al-Bannā in 1949 
was followed by infighting and disagreements over which direction the Brotherhood should take. 
Al-Huḍaybī experienced the same difficult balancing act as his predecessor regarding al-
Niẓām al-Khāṣṣ and the Brotherhood's stance on the use of violence. On the one hand he spoke out 
against violent actions, but on the other failed to control the forces within al-Niẓām al-Khāṣṣ  who 
wanted to take on the regime.202 The assassination attempt on Nasser in October 1954 resulted in a 
crackdown on the Brotherhood which saw thousands of members arrested and six of them hanged. 
Rather than mute the militant elements of the Brotherhood, the experience of jail and torture 
only made them more bent on fighting the regime. The one that emerged as the ideological leader of  
this faction was Sayyid Quṭb whose ideas represented an important break with the tradition of al-
Bannā.203 While al-Bannā had supported attacks against British forces, he was far less supportive 
when it came to attacks on Egyptians. Quṭb's view, on the other hand, was an uncompromising one, 
detached from the overall pragmatism of al-Bannā.204 Moreover, al-Bannā's vision was that an 
Islamic state would more or less follow as a natural consequence of the Islamisation of the people, 
whereas Quṭb saw the need for jihād to overcome the jāhiliyya rulers of today and implement 
Sharia. Therefore Quṭb's approach was that of a change from the top and downwards, whilst al-
Bannā's focus was on a transformation of society from below.  
When Sayyid Quṭb was hanged by the regime in 1966 and became a shahīd (martyr), his 
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ideas gained even more weight. Within The Muslim Brotherhood, a group which came to be known 
as Tanẓīm 1965 (Organisation 1965) and whose inspiration was drawn from Quṭb, had formed. The 
group supported tougher measures against the regime, and there were even discussion about 
assassinating president Nasser.205 In turn, this lead to a crackdown on the Tanẓīm in 1965 (thereby 
the group's name), and the Brotherhood found itself in the middle of another major crisis.206 
Once again the Brotherhood found itself divided over which approach the movement should 
take towards the state. And although al-Huḍaybī had initially been receptive to Milestones, 
announcing Quṭb as «the future of the Muslim da´wa», the older guard within the Brotherhood, al-
Huḍaybī included, came to see him as a threat to the philosophy of the Brotherhood.207 Hence, with 
the followers of Quṭb – al-Quṭbiyyin (the Qutbists) – gaining strength within the Brotherhood, al-
Huḍaybī saw the need to distance himself from the martyr. In 1969 he published his renowned book 
Du´ā lā Quḍā  (Preachers not Judges) where he rejects the idea of Egypt being a country in the state 
of jāhiliyya. According to al-Huḍaybī, it was in the state of juhl (sic) and was merely in the need of 
a correction in the direction of the teachings of the Brotherhood.208 
Despite Du´āa lā quḍāa being an influential work – also on the generations that were to 
come – al-Huḍaybī failed to unite the movement around a moderate and non-violent approach. On 
the contrary, in Quṭb's ideas radical elements both inside and outside the Brotherhood had a 
«theoretical tool that provided them with an analysis of the state they were combating and charted 
the road to its destruction and its replacement by a Muslim state», Kepel points out209. 
That Quṭb became the ideological figurehead for generation after generation of young 
Islamists bent on establishing an Islamic state by force, is undeniable. Pargeter claims however, that 
Quṭb radicalised the Brotherhood as such.210 
I find this view poorly documented and the arguing confusing, as the radicalism in question 
increased in the 1970s, according to Pargeter. This was a period when a number of brothers had just 
been released from prison and were cautious in its relations with the regime, as I will argue in the 
next part of the chapter. Furthermore, Pargeter presents both JI and al-Takfīr wa al-Hijra (Jamā´a al-
Muslimīn) as evidence of the Brotherhood's alleged radicalisation, which I find strange. 
Even if JI did not denounce violence outright in its initial years, the members were not 
entirely Qutbists – the sources of influence were many, as I highlighted in the preceding chapter.  
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Moreover, the radical elements rejected the `Ikhwān, as I will demonstrate in the next chapter.  
Hence, neither they nor their more moderate comrades can be put forward as proof of radicalisation 
within the Brotherhood. 
The same goes for Shukrī Muṣṭafā and al-Takfīr wa al-Hijra. Even though Muṣṭafā allegedly 
started out as a Muslim brother, his actions many years after his departure from the `Ikhwān is poor 
proof of the Brotherhood's radicalisation.211 Muṣṭafā never rejoined the movement after being 
released from prison in 1971 and his teachings were quite the opposite of those of the Brotherhood.
212  
I therefore think it is more correct to say that Quṭb was a clear inspiration for the increasing 
number of radical groups that emerged in the 1970s, but that this radicalism failed to influence the 
official line of the Brotherhood. 
Out of prison, Out of Members 
It is said that the first thing the future Brotherhood General Guide ´Umar al-Tilmisānī did when he 
was let out of prison by the Sadat regime in 1971 was to visit the president in the ´Abdīn Palace in 
Cairo and thank him personally.213
The attitude illustrates the changes that had taken place both within the regime and the 
Brotherhood in the period after Sadat assumed the presidency in October 1970.  After winning an 
internal fight for power against people still loyal to Nasser's ideas – the so-called Corrective 
Revolution in May 1971 – Sadat set about making his own mark on the Egyptian society, among 
other things easing the heavy surveillance and repression of dissident forces.214
The Muslim Brotherhood was the main benefactor of Sadat's conciliatory attitude towards 
the political opposition who had been severely repressed during the reign of his predecessor. 
Numerous members were released from prison in the early 1970s as part of Sadat's wish to 
reconcile with the Islamist movement.215 In 1972 ´Umar al-Tilmisānī succeeded Ḥasan al-Huḍaybī 
as General Guide after the latter's death. Although many from the al-Niẓām al-Khāṣṣ – among them 
people such as future al-murshid al-´ām Muṣṭafā Mashhūr, `Aḥmad Ḥasanayn and Kamāl al-
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Sanānīrī – initially viewed al-Tilmisānī as figurehead from behind whose back they could operate 
freely, the new leader proved himself an influential figure.216 
Al-Tilmisānī's first years in power saw little, if any, opposition to the regime on the part of 
the Brotherhood, according to Muṣṭafā.217 The Brotherhood's initial reaction to two of Sadat's major 
policy changes after the October War – an opening up of the economy (Infitāḥ) and a general 
orientation to the West – demonstrates this. 
The Western turn in the foreign policy was far from rejected by the Brotherhood, and al-
Tilmisānī advocated that Egypt «had to stretch out» to countries in the West «in a way they like». 218 
Furthermore, despite Infitāḥ ultimately leading to a growing social gap, the al-Tilmisānī saw 
no need to oppose it.219 He saw nothing wrong in wealth itself and was obviously not in favour of 
any compulsory redistribution of it: «We do not call for the rich to give up their wealth, the contrary 
is true».220    
The Brotherhood had their reasons for supporting Sadat's policy shift. As far as the foreign 
policy is concerned, Sadat had already indicated his reluctance towards the Soviets when he threw 
out nearly 20.000 Soviet technicians from Egypt in the summer of 1972.221 Besides being a godless 
Communist state, the soviet Union was also associated with Nasser who was largely a hated figure 
among the `Ikhwān.222 Thus, the West may have been regarded a lesser «evil».   
The new «open door»-policy in the economic field also marked a departure from the politics 
of Nasser, whose Socialism preferred tight governmental control of the economy. However, The 
Brotherhood had additional reasons for embracing the Infitāḥ. It gave the movement opportunities 
that were out of reach under Nasser. The Brotherhood contributed widely to the new economic 
activity, setting up multiple institutions dealing with Islamic investment and banking. 223 «You will 
find Muslim Brothers behind a lot banks today», al-Tilmisānī admitted.199 According to Muṣṭafā, 
the Brotherhood's return to the economic sphere, may have helped the return to Egypt of many of 
those who emigrated to the Gulf in the 1960s and made huge fortunes there.
For Sadat, the Brotherhood played a crucial role in the first years of his reign when he 
searched for new and different sources of legitimacy compared to the ones that his predecessor had 
leaned against. Religion was crucial to this strategy, as Sadat styled himself al-ra`īs al-mu`min (the 
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believing president), was careful that photographs of him attending Friday prayers made the press, 
changed Egypt's slogan to al-´ilm wa al-`īmān (knowledge and faith) and in 1971 made the Sharia 
the main source of legislation in the new constitution.224 
In spite of the initial peace between the Brotherhood and Sadat, the relationship did not lead 
to any official legal recognition of the movement, neither as a political party or religious 
organisation. On the other hand, the Brotherhood's support was not unconditional and was mostly 
provided when it served their own interests and left their ideology unexposed to any threat.225 Thus, 
when the obligations of the «truce» with Sadat clashed with their own goals, the ´Ikhwān chose to 
oppose the President. This became more evident in the latter half of the 1970s, when Sadat's 
political line clashed with that of the Islamist movement on numerous occasions, as we shall see in 
the next chapter.
Meeting the Younger Guard
As mentioned in the last chapter, many of the JI founders came in contact with members of the 
Muslim Brotherhood in the first year in university as medical students at the Qaṣr al-´Aynī hospital 
in Cairo. Though it was not until a few years later that JI leaders were approached by members of 
the Brotherhood in order to persuade them to join the ranks of the `Ikhwān. 
In Muṣṭafā's view, the Brotherhood's contact with the young students was based on a need 
for additional weight in their struggle for more concessions from the government; the Brotherhood 
had to make the public more sympathetic to the movement's thoughts and in doing so the attention 
was drawn to the jamā´āt.226 
Moreover, this strategy would also give the Brotherhood a chance to rebuild itself. There 
was a desperate need for renewal within the `Ikhwān in the early 1970s, according to Pargeter, who 
describes the movement before meeting JI as primarily a «leadership with no one to lead».227 `Abū 
al-Futūḥ recalls that when they entered the Brotherhood, they «pledged allegiance to an idea, a 
project, a history... Because there was no Brotherhood organisation in the sense of the word 
'organisation'. It was a group of individuals or historical leaders that from us received the leadership 
of an organisation that existed in reality».228    
This view is supported by the fact that the Brotherhood leaders insisted that the JI's eventual 
affiliation with the `Ikhwān should be kept secret. The reason, says `Abū al-Futūḥ – one of the 
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leaders who negotiated the association on behalf of parts of JI – was that president Sadat had 
allowed JI to organise and work freely both inside and outside the universities.229 The Brotherhood, 
and especially the General Guide ´Umar al-Tilmisānī, feared that this situation could change if the 
regime learned that large parts of the Islamist youth suddenly were under the leadership of the 
`Ikhwān. In other words, he saw in the young religious students a popular base for the Brotherhood 
and a great resource.230 Moreover, these youths could still operate without the obstacles the old 
guard faced, as the Muslim Brotherhood was still banned by law, despite the regime easing the 
pressure on the movement.    
The initial attitude of the JI leaders towards the Brotherhood was hesitant, however. As I 
indicated in the previous chapter, at the time of the first conversations with the leadership of the 
`Ikhwān, the JI front men saw themselves as the ones who were actually leading the «Islamic 
work», whereas the Brotherhood was merely a thing of the past.231 Numerous options were 
discussed amongst the JI leadership, even inviting the Muslim brothers to join them. 
Besides, the `Ikhwān were not as strict as JI wished in regard to the latter's Salafist-inspired 
demands of «Islamic appearance» – they did not sport long beards and even had pictures on the 
walls of their homes.232 Some Brotherhood members allegedly chose to comfort the young guard  by 
growing beards, while others – among them ´Umar al-Tilmisānī – refused and tried to convince the 
students that growing a beard was not a duty.233
An important factor in this process, that seems to have contributed deeply to many JI 
members eventually joining the Brotherhood, was the fact that the students first met with the 
remnants of al-Niẓām al-khāṣṣ and Tanẓīm 1965: «I was drawn towards an undertaking that evoked 
the spirit of jihād and secret work», `Abū al-Futūḥ recalls.234 Before he and other JI leaders joined 
the Brotherhood, their methods and way of thinking were closer to that of Tanẓīm 1965.235 What 
appealed to the young JI leaders was the group's methodology of coup and revolution (manhajiyya 
al-inqilāb wa al-thawra) and their earlier desire to bring down president Nasser as revenge for what 
he had done to the country.
It is also beyond doubt that the young men looked up to the older Islamists who had spent 
dozens of years behind bars because of their beliefs: «The spiritual powers some of their members 
had shown during twenty years in prison drew us towards the Brotherhood», al-´Aryān recalls236.
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The mediating role of the more rigid figures from the two above-mentioned factions should 
not be underestimated. When the students complained about the leniency of the older guard in 
religious matters, the men from al-Niẓām al-khāṣṣ and Tanẓīm 1965 supposedly softened the 
atmosphere. The initial differences between the old and young were real enough, though, as `Abū 
al-Futūḥ illustrates: «Had we met with the old, moderate brothers first, for example ´Umar al-
Tilmisānī and those close to him, we would have decided not join the group».237
With leading JI members aboard, the Brotherhood had managed to undertake the renewal it 
desperately needed. In `Abū al-Futūḥ's words, the «`Ikhwān was an empty house that was filled 
with the youth of al-Jamā´a al-`Islāmiyya who pumped blood into it».238 Nevertheless, the 
movement now had the allegiance of some of the most active and capable student politicians in the  
country, among them al-´Aryān and `Abū al-Futūḥ, who were later to become both prominent 
leaders of Egyptian trade unions and occupy high positions inside the Brotherhood itself.
Won over by the Moderates
The process of deciding to join the Brotherhood took the leaders of JI approximately a year.239 
When they eventually agreed to join, they found themselves in a movement divided between a 
moderate old guard led by al-Tilmisānī and more hard-line elements rooted in the slightly younger 
al-Niẓām al-Khāṣṣ and Tanẓīm 1965.
In the beginning, it was the latter group that appealed the most to the students that was about 
to enter the Brotherhood.240 The JI members that affiliated with the Brotherhood had yet to distance 
themselves entirely from the use of violence, a question they debated heavily with the General 
Guide ´Umar al-Tilmisānī.241 He appears to have been crucial to the transformation, as it was during 
these conversations the students became gradually more opposed to the use of violence until they 
dismissed the idea altogether later in the decade.242
In the process of changing the students' minds it was critical to increase their tolerance 
towards those with different beliefs. At the time they entered the Brotherhood, the young Islamists 
«suffered from anger with those who opposed us, and maybe also anger with the concept of 
disagreement in itself and especially if the disagreement concerned religion (...) This narrow-
mindedness and dismissal of difference and tolerance of adversaries made us practice intellectual 
237 `Abū al-Futūḥ, Shāhid ´alā tārīkh al-ḥaraka al-ìslāmiyya fī miṣr 1970-1984, 95. My translation.
238 Abū al-Futūḥ, Shāhid ´alā tārīkh al-ḥaraka al-ìslāmiyya fī miṣr 1970-1984, 91. My translation.
239 «Al-´Aryān ytaḥaddath ´an nasha`a al-tayār al-`islāmī bi-l-jāma´āt al-miṣriyya», Ikhwanonline.
240 Pargeter, The Muslim Brotherhood: The Burden of Tradition, 41.
241 `Abū al-Futūḥ, Shāhid ´alā tārīkh al-ḥaraka al-ìslāmiyya fī miṣr 1970-1984, 69.
242 Interview with ´Abd al-Mun´im `Abū al-Futūḥ, October 2010.
55
terrorism», `Abū al-Futūḥ explains.243
Up until then they had dreamed about «establishing a new state in a land like Egypt, one of 
the oldest nations in the world», and did not see this as naive.244 As well as softening the students' 
approach to difference of opinion, al-Tilmisānī appears to have made them realise the naivety of 
their ideas and that violence would not bring the results they wanted: «We were young», says Māḍī, 
who affiliated with the Brotherhood in 1979, «though with time we became more moderate. Joining 
the Brotherhood was a kind of underscoring on our part of our change of minds on the use of 
violence.».245  
Al-Tilmisānī himself describes how the Minister of the Interior at the time, Muḥammad al-
Nabawī `Ismā´īl, would call him in order to get advice on how to deal with the Islamist student 
organisation.246 According to al-Tilmisānī, the Minister would even ask him to go to some university 
faculties to talk to the students. The General Guide says that the student responded to him and 
accepted his arguments against the use of violence and participating in demonstrations, strikes and 
sabotage. 
In addition to being convinced of the futility of using violence, another factor contributed to 
pushing the students towards supporting peaceful means of change. While many of the students 
were engaged in dialogue with al-Tilmisānī, they were at the same time gaining influence in student  
politics, as I showed in the first part of this chapter. 
The experience of student politics made it clear to the JI leaders that there existed an 
alternative to the jihādī way preached by some units of JI, and, moreover, that they could be 
successful. Despite the fact that the political experience appears to have preceded the eventual  
denial of violence on part of some of the JI members, it was nevertheless a confirmation of the non-
violent path they were to follow in the coming years. 
Conclusion
This chapter have demonstrated how JI grew stronger and in the end won the student elections at 
eight of twelve universities in Egypt. Pivotal to their domination was their welfare programs and 
their determination to educate their followers in the Islamic faith.
In the second part of this chapter I have demonstrated how the Muslim Brotherhood adopted 
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a cooperative attitude towards the government under the new regime of president Sadat. 
Notwithstanding the fact that the `Ikhwān only cooperated as long as they benefited from it, the new 
stance towards the regime is nevertheless a proof of the changing political climate in Egypt in the 
1970s towards openness and wider liberties in regard to political organisation. 
In this new reality, the Brotherhood saw a need for renewal and additional means to put 
more pressure on the regime. The solution was to attract the leaders of the Islamic student 
movement, as this would both extend the powerbase and see to a renewal of the Brotherhood. The 
move was a success for the Brotherhood as the new members were far more politicised than earlier 
`Ikhwān generations, which in turn gave the movement a sense of urgency.247 Moreover, some of 
these young men proved to be highly capable and came to dominate the Islamist movement for the 
next decades. 
In regard to the process of winning over the JI leaders, I have shown how the «veterans» 
from al-Niẓām al-Khāṣṣ and Tanẓīm 1965 played a pivotal role. The beliefs of the young Islamists 
were at the time heavy influenced by the heritage of the likes of Quṭb, if not in its most radical  
form. There is reason to believe that without those two hard-line factions providing a sort of «soft 
landing» for the students in the initial interaction with the Brotherhood, JI may never have joined in 
such numbers as they eventually did.  
However, the students did not settle for a position on the dark fringes of the Brotherhood, 
unwilling to change their positions on the need for violence and revolt. In the period that followed, 
they were greatly influenced by the moderate line of General Guide ´Umar al-Tilmisānī and before 
long they set about convincing their JI colleagues of the need for restraint in relation to violence. 248
However, it is important to emphasise that far from the whole of JI agreed to enter the 
Brotherhood. The «negotiations» between the `Ikhwān and the leaders and important members of JI 
took place in secrecy not only because of al-Tilmisānī's fear of loosing campus as a place of Islamic 
activism. 
There were also many elements within JI who looked upon the Brotherhood as a weak 
organisation and refused any contact with it whatsoever. The JI leaders were perfectly aware that 
their affiliation with the Brotherhood would meet with staunch opposition from some of the other 
leaders and a possible split inside the Islamist student movement.249 Hence, they had their own 
reason for keeping the talks secret. 
Indeed, when the news finally broke in late 1979, it led to an outcry and a subsequent 
division of JI. That process will be discussed in the next chapter.   
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Chapter IV: The Division of JI
This chapter will deal with the decline of JI at the universities in the late 1970s and in the end the 
organisation's split in 1981. The reasons for these developments will be presented in two separate 
parts. 
The first will show JI's relations to the society, politics and the Sadat regime, i.e. deal with 
external reasons for the division of the Islamist student movement. 
The second part will concern itself with the developments and internal divisions of JI in the 
latter half of the decade. The last part of the chapter will be devoted to the role of the regime in JI's  
downfall, before I end the chapter with a discussion of eternal versus internal reasons for the split.
 
Part 1
1977 is regarded as a watershed in the relationship between the Sadat regime and the Islamist 
movement in Egypt. The main reason is Sadat's historic visit to Jerusalem and the peace treaty that  
followed two years later. 
The peace with Israel enraged the Islamists, who answered with fierce attacks in their 
periodicals and mass demonstrations staged by JI. 1977 also saw the «Bread Riots» in January. 
Until the January 25th Revolution which forced president Hosni Mubarak form power this year, 
these two days of protests were widely regarded as the largest expression of anti-government 
sentiment after World War II. The Islamists were not the driving force in these events however, 
although they sympathised with the people's demands. Both JI and the `Ikhwān used the occasion to 
criticise the Infitāḥ – the project of liberalising the economy – which the Sadat regime had 
embarked upon after the October War in 1973. Later, the president's support for the Shah of Iran 
became another rallying point where the Islamists firmly demonstrated that they now belonged to 
the opposition. 
Albeit Sadat appeared to be committed to the Islamisation of Egypt, he took few, if any, 
concrete steps to put his promised policy into practice. On the contrary, in the closing years of the 
1970s the «Believing President» often chose to go his own ways, avoiding the calls from the 
Islamist camp.250  
Hence, the latter part of the decade saw Sadat clash politically with the Islamist movement 
on a number of occasions, with 1977 being the starting point. However, while JI did not hesitate 
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organising demonstrations against the regime, some of whom developed into violent clashes with 
the security forces, the `Ikhwān took pains not to engage in an open conflict with Sadat.251 
The first part will also illuminate the importance of the re-emergence of the al-Da´wa 
magazine in 1976 and the role it played in the growing Islamist opposition to the regime at a time 
when the movement was growing bolder, fuelled by JI's sweeping victories in the student elections 
of the academic year 1977-78.
It also important to have in mind that at this point most of the JI leaders in Cairo and the 
Delta had affiliated with the Brotherhood, although not yet made their membership public. The 
affiliation included adopting a more moderate line regarding the use of violence, a process which 
was accounted for in the previous chapter. The first part of this chapter will demonstrate how JI 
placed themselves on the non-violent side when forced to take sides in the Jamā´a al-Muslimīn case 
that broke in the summer of 1977.  
The Face of the Moderate JI
When the case of Shukrī Muṣṭafā's Jamā´a al-Muslimīn (better known as al-Takfīr wa al-Hijra, the 
name given to the group by the press at the time), filled the newspapers in the summer of 1977, the 
JI was fast to condemn it.
On the July 3rd Jamā´a al-Muslimīn kidnapped and later killed the Minister of `Awqāf, 
Muḥammad Ḥusayn al-Dhahabī. JI quickly distanced itself from the group, claiming that they had 
«fought the group from the very beginning» and that Jamā´a al-Muslimīn «is destroying Islam».252 
Furthermore, Jamā´a al-Muslimīn was labelled an extremist group without any real support inside 
the university. Four days later, JI in Alexandria saw the need to send out a statement where Jamā´a 
al-Muslimīn was once again condemned.253 
Even so, JI still felt the need to warn against the abuse of Muslim men and women who 
appreciate the «traditions of the Umma». The warning suggests that JI feared being likened to 
Shukrī Muṣṭafā's group. 
However, if one goes as far as Kepel, claiming that JI «gave the regime what it wanted» by 
publicly denouncing Jamā´a al-Muslimīn – which implicates that JI to a certain degree approved or 
sympathised with the group – one is turning a blind eye to the evident differences between the two 
groups.254 
251 Baker, Sadat and After, 246.
252 `Amīma Ḥātim, «Shabāb al-jamā´āt al-`Islāmiyya yakshif `asālīb Jamā´at al-Takfīr», al-Ahrām, July 12th, 1977.
253 «Al-Jamā´āt al-dīniyya wa al-ṭulābiyya tudīn al-`irhāb bi-ism al-dīn», al-Ahrām, July 16th, 1977. 
254 Kepel, Muslim Extremism in Egypt, 148.
60
Despite all its ambiguity and simplicity, Jamā´a al-Muslimīn was ideologically and 
strategically more streamlined than JI. The group centred round the strategy of withdrawal in a 
period of weakness, inspired by Prophet Muḥammad's hijra to Medina in 622. What caused the 
weakness, was the kāfir (infidel) nature of society. It was a duty for all Muslims,  Jamā´a al-
Muslimīn argued, to withdraw from such societies – i.e. all societies not governed by the Sharia.255 
Until the group felt forced to act violently, their strategy was to build counter-societies in which the 
members lived in accordance with their interpretation of Islam. As the trial after the murder of al-
Dhahabī revealed, this was an extremely literal reading of the Koran and the āḥādīth that reached 
the extent of backing illiteracy since the Prophet had not opened schools in order to teach people to 
read and write.256
The majority of JI, on the other hand, had quite the opposite approach. First of all, they still 
regarded Egypt as a Muslim country.257 Secondly, they also disapproved of branding fellow 
Muslims as kuffār, an attitude shared with the Muslim Brotherhood's founder, ḤasanḤasan al-
Bannā. Thirdly, their ideological basis consisted of numerous directions, as I pointed out in the first 
chapter.
In short, JI was an organisation of inclusiveness, whereas Jamā´a al-Muslimīn cherished the 
exclusiveness of their little group. 
Their different ideological fundaments also influenced their strategies. While Jamā´at al-
Muslimīn withdrew and refused to have anything to do with the jāhiliyya society, JI worked more or 
less within the boarders of society, and, notably, in an outward fashion. Their moderate elements 
relied upon da´wa to change society, arranging summer camps, writing pamphlets and taking part in 
student politics. 
Although Jamā´at al-Muslimīn is too extraordinary a group to be put in the same category as 
jihādī  groups such as al-Jihād and al-Fanniyya al-´Askariyya, they still share a concept of changing 
society from the top. The fact that they threatened to kill the hostage al-Dhahabī if their demands 
were not met, reveals this attitude. They were willing to realise their goals by coercion, if necessary.
JI had quite the contrary approach. Although calling for the implementation of the Sharia 
and the setting up of an Islamic state, their actions was more in line with the aim of al-Tilmisānī;  
creating of an Islamic society rather than an Islamic state.258 The state would follow as a natural 
consequence of the piety of a majority of Muslims. Their tactics were therefore an Islamising of 
society from bottom and upwards, as al-´Aryān points out, rather than the Jamā´at al-Muslimīn and 
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similar groups' top-down approach.259
Therefore, there is absolutely reason to believe that a majority of JI genuinely disagreed with 
Shukrī Muṣṭafā's group, rather than paying lip service to Sadat. There may however, have been 
elements within JI that started to feel disillusioned in the last years of the decade, as Sadat's Islamic 
commitment never seemed to be fully implemented into his politics, as Hinnebusch suggests.260 A 
similar development had taken place in the late 1930s, when a group within the Brotherhood grew 
disillusioned with Ḥasan al-Bannā's leadership, due to what was regarded as his gradual and passive 
approach.261 The alleged leader of the group, `Aḥmad Rif´at, accused the leadership of busying 
themselves with the government rather than challenge it for not implementing the Sharia.   
More or less the same accusations were made against those from JI who joined the 
Brotherhood some forty years later. According to `Abū al-Futūḥ, the radical wing in Upper Egypt 
complained that the moderates were «weak truce mongers»: «In their eyes we preferred well-being 
over fighting the system».262 
Hence, Kepel's notion that «Shukri's radicalism and the daring with which he defied the state 
and expressed his ideas produced more than a few admirers among the rank-and-file Islamicist 
student militants», at least has a historic parallel and may hold some truth.263
Part two of this chapter will deal with JI's internal struggle and how the movement 
eventually split.
Infitāḥ and Westernisation
On the field of domestic politics, the Infitāḥ – the economic «open-door policy» – was increasingly 
becoming a source for opposition in the latter half of the 1970s. However supportive of the reform 
in its initial years, the Islamist camp began to see Infitāḥ as a tool for Western penetration of the 
country; not only had Egypt become economically dependent on the West, but in the wake of the 
new policy followed the influx of Western culture.264 
Furthermore, the growing gap between the rich and the poor blamed on Infitāḥ ran contrary 
to many Muslims' notion of Islamic justice. Following the so-called «Bread Riots» in January 1977, 
the Islamic camp decried the inefficiency, corruption and not at least injustice that the liberalised  
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economy brought with it.265 
The Infitāḥ can be viewed as yet another of Sadat's efforts to rid Egypt of Nasserism.266 And, 
as Sadat sought loans from The International Monetary Fund (IMF), he had to reform the economy 
along more capitalist lines. This including opening up the Egyptian economy to more imports and 
exports, and also brought along with it cuts in public spending.
The demonstrations in January 1977 saw thousands – coming from all parts of the political 
scale, including Islamists – take to the streets to protest the rise in food prices. However, the 
uprising must be seen in a wider context than just the price of food. Many of the protesters were just 
as much opposing the results of the government's course; the austerity and cuts in consumption for 
the poor, while the rich were growing considerably richer.267 
It is also worth noting that parts of the protest were directed at the casinos and nightclubs.268 
The destruction of some of these establishments had a double symbolism to them; for Islamists, 
they had long been the symbols of the moral corruption westernisation brought with it, while many 
poor people were angered by the Egyptian nouveau riche who frequented these places along with 
Western tourists. On the whole, a belief began to dominate among Egyptians that the increasing 
corruption and collapsing moral – both personal and business life – was caused by foreigners, be 
they Arab or Western.269 
Barely a month later, ´Abd al-Mun´im `Abū al-Futūḥ caught the president off guard in a 
discussion which was broadcasted on live television. Among a number of complaints, `Abū al-
Futūḥ, at the time president of the student union at the University of Cairo and secretary of national 
student union's media committee, attacked the president for the harsh treatment peaceful 
demonstrators were given by the security forces.270 
Although the first cracks in the «truce» between the regime and the `Ikhwān became 
apparent in 1976 – due to the latter's persistence in its struggle to gain legitimacy as either a 
political party or religious organisation – it was not until the riots of January 1977 that the 
Brotherhood openly sided with the opposition.271 
Instrumental in this transformation was the magazine al-Da´wa (The Call) which was 
allowed to publish again from 1976 after a 22 year ban. The magazine condemned the mounting 
prices which caused the «Bread Riots», but also went further to criticise the lack of political 
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freedom in Egypt, as well as the freedom of expression and to organise.272 Al-Da´wa called for a 
system of shūrā (council) as they thought that was the political system that complied best with 
Islamic teachings. Naturally, there were also regular calls for the implementation of the Sharia.
The JI leaders' affiliation with the Brotherhood coincided more or less with the re-
emergence of al-Da´wa. The combination contributed to push the Brotherhood in a more political 
direction. As I have pointed out earlier, the new generation was not one used to work in secrecy an 
hiding, rather it was accustomed to voicing their opinion quite openly. As they became more and 
more a household part of the Brotherhood in the latter years of the 1970s and early 1980s, they 
aspired to push the movement in a direction where it engaged itself more in «socio-economic 
challenges such as poverty and corruption».273 The group was more politically aware, and for them, 
that stage proved just as important as the religious and ideological debate. 
Sadat also made himself unpopular in the Islamist camp by pushing for a new law on 
personal status. For years, many proposals to a new law had been debated, though without any 
consensus being reached. This prompted Sadat to take the matters into his own hands. In 1979 he 
passed a controversial proposal into law through an emergency decree.274 
Men were now obliged to inform their first wife through a court order if they wanted to 
remarry, whereas before they could have four wives all oblivious of one another.275 Moreover, the 
first wife obtained the right to an immediate divorce and the right to live in her husband's home 
until their children reached the age of majority. 
The new law had was a victory for Egyptian feminists who had fought for a reform for 
decades, and their victory was accompanied by a more visible struggle against taboo issues, among 
them contraception and clitoridectomy.276
From the Islamists' point of view, the law went contrary to what is prescribed in Islam, 
namely that a man is allowed to have four wives. It was labelled «Jihan's laws» after Sadat's wife, 
Jihan.277 She had a British mother, was regarded as a westernised woman and allegedly her support 
for the law reform strongly influenced the president's decision.278 Sadat himself warned against «the 
misuse of religion as a mask behind which man hides his vindictive desire to maintain absolute 
supremacy over women». For the Islamist however, it seemed like Sadat was backtracking and once 
more choosing the Western alternative over the Islamic one when presented with a choice. 
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Peace with Israel and the Revolution in Iran
What probably caused the most anger – in all political camps, Islamist as well as leftist – during 
Sadat's presidency, was his strive for a peace agreement with Israel. The process was part of Sadat's 
reorientation to the West where the ultimate goal apparently was to boost the deteriorating Egyptian 
economy.279 In this process, a peace with Israel would be helpful in drawing more Western 
investments.
His journey to Israel in November 1977 to get the Israelis' attention sparked heavy criticism 
at home. In this case, however, it is worth noting that the Brotherhood's official reaction was much 
more cautious than JI's. 
The Brotherhood declared that Sadat's trip to Jerusalem was disapproved of by Islam, but 
apart from that saved its harshest criticism for Israel.280 A peace with Israel would not bring 
prosperity, they argued, but rather give the Zionists a chance to penetrate Egyptians' minds and 
change their mentality.
But the `Ikhwān appears to have been careful not to go too far in their criticism of the peace 
negotiations. Al-Tilmisānī was keen to point out that the Brotherhood's aim was not to oppose the 
government, but to appeal for an end to the occupation of Palestinian lands. Moreover, al-Da´wa 
asked other Muslim countries not to judge Sadat's Jerusalem before the outcome of it was clear.      
In their reaction to the Camp David Accord in 1978, the `Ikhwān also focused more on the 
content of the accord – arguing that it was vague on the question of borders and decrying the 
absence of any references to Jerusalem – rather than going all out against the president himself.281 
When the peace treaty was completed and signed in Washington in 1979, however, the Brotherhood 
placed itself firmly among the critics. General Guide al-Tilmisānī declared that the deal should be  
fought to the end by all Muslims.282 It was impossible for a Muslim to accept an occupation of his 
land, al-Tilmisānī said, adding that the `Ikhwān's opposition to the peace agreement was religiously 
motivated. Al-Tilmisānī still refused to engage in a full-scale attack on Sadat, and he rejected the  
Arab boycott of Egypt after the signing of the treaty, demanding from those countries to come up 
with an alternative.283 
Sadat had released the brothers early in the 1970s on the condition that they did not involve 
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themselves in politics.284 Yet, when the implications of Sadat's redirected foreign policy became 
clear, it became increasingly difficult for the Brotherhood to keep their end of the «bargain». From 
an Islamic point of view, al-Tilmisānī saw the American support for Israel as dangerous, while the 
widespread Westernisation was corrupting the youth of Egypt and undermining her culture and 
Islamic heritage.285 Nevertheless, the Brotherhood's response to Sadat's peace initiative was far 
more tempered compared to other Islamist movements in Egypt, among them JI. 
 JI's rejection of the peace and normalisation of the ties with Israel was total, and the 
organisation made their views public already from November 1977, printing leaflets, organising 
conferences both on campus and in mosques, as well as taking to the streets in protest marches that 
at times ended in violence.286 JI also warned against perceiving the conflict as Israeli-Arab. Using a 
more religious vocabulary than the `Ikhwān, JI argued that this was a clash between Judaism and 
Islam and that the only solution to the conflict was jihād. To wage jihād, JI argued, an Islamic state 
had to be established, hence postponing the immediate call to take up arms against Israel.
A similar mode of reaction can be observed in regard to the Iranian Revolution. The 
revolution was a populist burst where millions took to the streets in the final months of 1978 and 
which led to the overthrow of Muhammed Reza Pahlavi, the Shah of Iran, a couple of months later.
287 The protesters in the streets of Tehran and elsewhere in the country condemned the secular and 
authoritarian Pahlavi regime with its strong ties to the US, and called for the establishment of an 
Islamic state. 
 Sadat – at the time heavily engaged in the final negotiations with Israel over the peace 
treaty which was signed on March 26th 1979 – condemned the demonstrations and sided firmly with 
the Shah. When he eventually was forced to step down on February 11th the same year, the Shah 
found his exile in Egypt. However, the backing of the Shah against what turned out to be an Islamic 
Revolution did not go down well with neither JI nor the Muslim Brotherhood. 
Although the Iranian demonstrators were Shiites, many of their demands corresponded with 
those of the Islamic movement in Egypt. They were both opposed to Western influence and the 
secular nature of their regimes. After Egypt's peace with Israel, both countries also recognised the 
Jewish state – to the resentment of not only Islamists, but large parts of the populations.  
Compared to the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty, the revolution in Iran did not have the same 
unifying effect on the Islamist movement in Egypt. One reason was the traditional divide and 
suspicion between the Sunni and Shia directions of Islam, carefully observed by the likes of Saudi 
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Arabia which explains the Salafi rejection of the revolution.288 Despite the fact that this view also 
influenced the Brotherhood and JI to some extent, they both supported the revolution. 
 Notwithstanding the Brotherhood's explicit support of the revolution, the organisation was 
careful to underline that it was not calling for revolution itself.289 Instead the `Ikhwān emphasised 
the need for both ruled and rulers to unite under the banner of Islam. They were also sceptical to the 
new Iranian regime's appeal to other Islamic movements to wage jihād against their governments. 
And, although al-Tilmisānī visited Tehran on numerous occasions, the relations between the new 
Islamic republic and the Brotherhood soured rather quickly.290 This was due to the accusations 
against al-Tilmisānī coming from Tehran claiming that he was an American agent. The background 
was the General Guide's efforts to mediate during the American hostage crisis. Additionally, after 
the war between Iran and Iraq broke out in 1980, Saudi hostility towards Tehran grew. This also 
affected the Brotherhood's position because of its connections with Saudi Arabia.
Despite the somewhat reserved response to the Iranian revolution, it nevertheless had a huge 
influence on the Brotherhood, giving them, as Abdelnasser remarks, a great deal of confidence.291 
Their reservations at the time must be seen in the light of their struggle to become a legally  
recognised political force in Egypt. Important to that struggle was the need for the `Ikhwān to 
present itself as a moderate force in a period when theirs and the regime's ways parted on an 
increasing number of occasions. 
Furthermore, the Brotherhood did not phrase their outspoken views on events in Iran at all 
times. In the universities and mosques, JI expressed both their support for the revolution and their 
disgust for Sadat housing the Shah. As was the case in the opposition to the peace with Israel, JI 
once again organised demonstrations on a large scale, circulated leaflets praising the «movement of 
the masses» while denouncing «dependence on the United States».292 The Islamist students arranged 
sit-ins and street protests which emulated those in Iran. Some of the demonstrations staged in 
`Asyūṭ and Alexandria in March and April 1980 developed into violent clashes.
The JI's support for the Islamic revolutionaries in Iran had limits, however. The events in 
Iran was not more important than similar developments elsewhere, according to JI who pointed to 
Afghanistan, Eritrea, Chad and the Philippines.293 This view is not only evidence of JI's emphasis on 
Islam as a religion for all inhabitants on earth, but also a reluctance to fully recognise Khomeini.  
Although the national student union declared their support of Khomeini on a conference in al-
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Minyā on February 6th 1979, it is worth mentioning JI's national leadership never explicitly backed 
the Iranian Revolution.
Moreover, certain elements within JI distanced themselves from the Shia revolution and 
made it clear that they would refuse any support from Iran. Expressions such as these show that the 
Salafists, traditionally hostile to Shiism, still held sway over parts of JI in the closing years of the 
1970s. Even so, the revolution had an immense impact on the Islamist students, giving them a solid 
belief in their cause and claiming that the developments in Iran was proof of the victory that awaits  
those who follows in the path of God.294
As pointed out above, there were unmistakable similarities between Sadat and the Shah. 
Therefore, when JI condemned the secular leanings of the Shah, it was at the same time an attack on 
the Egyptian president who in the late 1970s seemed to play down the Islamic symbols that 
dominated his politics earlier in the decade. Furthermore, when the US influence on the Shah was 
criticised, the Islamists knew very well that their own leader looked to be following in his footsteps. 
The revolution in Iran worked as a moral and psychological boost for JI and should not be 
underestimated, argues Sonbol, referring to Iran's push to export the revolution to other countries in 
the region.295 
A number of demonstrations that started out as anti-Shah gatherings, developed into protests 
against Sadat. More than 500 students participated in the demonstrations organised by JI In `Asyuṭ 
on April 3rd 1980, chanting the slogan «The blood of Moslem youth will not be an offering for 
Sadat and the Shah».296 When the protesters reached the city centre, they were met by riot police 
who subsequently opened fire which killed one person and injured six seriously.297 Around sixty 
participants were arrested.
In their communiqués in 1980, JI became ever more explicit in their attacks on Sadat, 
criticising the burden placed on the Egyptian people by the boycott in the wake of the peace treaty 
with Israel that left Egypt isolated in the Arab world.
In the end it appears to have been the criticism of his foreign policy that made Sadat decide 
that enough was enough. In 1979 in `Ismā´īliyya he met with various leaders of the country's 
Islamic organisations, among them the General Guide of the Muslim Brotherhood, `Umar al-
Tilmisānī. The last months had seen harsh attacks against the `Ikhwān in the government-controlled 
press, blaming them for conspiring against the regime.298 Sadat continued in the same track, making 
no effort to disguise his displeasure with the Brotherhood, pointing out that he would not tolerate 
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«those who try to tamper with the high interests of the state under the guise of religion», before he 
made it clear that religion «must not be mingled with politics».299 Furthermore he also accused the 
`Ikhwān of inciting both people and students against the government and aiming at stirring up a 
sectarian strife.300 
Al-Tilmisānī's responded with calling for Sadat to implement the Sharia, only then would 
the masses support him, he said. According to the Brotherhood leader, he was invited to another 
meeting with Sadat a short while after their encounter in `Ismā´īliyya. This time Sadat struck a 
different chord, offering to broaden his «truce» with the `Ikhwān.301 He also offered to get the 
movement registered with the Ministry of Social Affairs along with a position for al-Tilmisānī as 
the Brotherhood's representative to the Shūrā Council. The General Guide rejected both offers, 
preferring to keep both himself and the organisation independent of the government. 
It may very well have been the last offer the Islamist movement received from the president. 
The following years up until the assassination of Sadat on October 6th 1981, saw a decline in the 
relationship between the «Believing President» and the Islamists.
 
Part 2
This part of the chapter will be dedicated to the various internal reasons for the eventual breaking 
up of JI. Earlier analysis, like the one conducted by Kepel for instance, has tended to focus on 
external forces; namely the rising pressure and subsequent crackdown on JI undertaken by the Sadat 
regime. For instance, Kepel identifies the widespread arrests on September 3 rd 1981 as the reason 
for JI's ultimate collapse.302  
When the authorities cracked down on JI, no part of the mainstream Egyptian society came 
to its rescue, Kepel remarks, and underscores the failure of JI to «persuade the Egyptian Muslim 
masses to fight alongside them for the victory of the umma».303 
Tønnessen also underlines the increasing resistance from the regime on campus as probably 
the most important reason for JI's split. He concentrates mostly on the restrictions put on JI's 
political activity in the universities from the academic year 1977-78 and onwards and refers to how 
their candidates were erased from the election lists at the universities of Cairo and Alexandria as  
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well as in the al-`Azhar university.304 In addition, the popular Islamic summer camps arranged by JI 
were in 1978 forced out of campus by Sadat's security forces.305
Tønnessen is also aware that internal divisions contributed to the downfall of JI, such as the 
majority of the leadership's affiliation with the Brotherhood. In doing this, he is also differentiating 
between moderate and radical parts of JI – a contrast Kepel rarely makes. However, it was the 
pressure from the regime, Tønnessen claims, that forced the dormant split within the student 
movement; the radical elements advocating a violent answer to the repression from 1979 an 
onwards, whereas the Brotherhood-associated fraction appealed to the JI-members to stick to a non-
violent approach.306 
I will explore the differences between the Upper Egypt camp of JI and the organisation in 
Cairo and the Delta, and explore which role these regional divisions played in the fragmentation of 
the Islamist student movement.  
In my opinion, neither of them is downright wrong in their analysis. However, as I will 
argue when I identify the reasons for JI's split in the following sections of this chapter, they both put 
too much weight on the clashes with the regime. The strained relations with the Sadat were more of 
a «last nail in the coffin» than an original reason for the split within JI.
Outrage and Infighting
As showed in the previous chapter, the Muslim Brotherhood was not held in high esteem among the 
ranks of JI in the early 1970s. Upon agreeing to join the `Ikhwān in the middle of the decade, the JI 
leadership in Cairo and the Delta were still not entirely convinced about the non-violent line 
adhered to by the General Guide `Umar al-Tilmisānī. However, after long discussions with al-
Tilmisānī, the majority of them were won over to the moderate camp. 
This process lasted from approximately 1974-75, when the first contact was made. It is hard 
to establish precisely when the different figureheads affiliated, but ´Abd al-Mun´im `Abū al-Futūḥ 
and ´Iṣām al-Aryān – both from Cairo – decided to join sometime during 1975-76. There is reason 
to believe that Muḥammad ´Abd al-Laṭīf, Sanā` `Abū al-Zayd followed them shortly afterwards.307 
`Ibrāhīm al-Za´farānī, maybe the most prominent JI leader in Alexandria, also appears to have 
joined the `Ikhwān at this time. The second round of affiliations began in the spring and sumer of 
1979, when JI moderates in al-Minyā were approached. As a result, Muḥy al-Dīn ´Īsā, `Abū al-´Ilā 
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Māḍī and Hashamat Khalīfa joined the Brotherhood.   
In all, between twelve and fifteen JI leaders joined the Brotherhood, which in turn spurred 
on a great number of other members to join the ranks of the `Ikhwān.308 
The secrecy surrounding not only the first group's affiliation with the Brotherhood, but also 
the second group, including `Abū al-´Ilā Māḍī and Muhy al-Dīn ´Īsā, is proof of the `Ikhwān's 
controversial role inside JI. In the previous chapter I have referred to al-Tilmisānī's reason for not 
making the new members public as he wished their work on campus to go on uninterrupted by the 
authorities. For the students, it was just as important to avoid the strong opposition from other blocs 
inside JI, most notably the Jihadists and the Salafists.309 When the news finally broke in 1979, it was 
those two factions who most eagerly denounced the decision to join the Brotherhood.
´Iṣām al-´Aryān describes how the move was received with shock and astonishment.310 `Abū 
al-Futūḥ also recalls great anger: «The jihādī wing said to us at that time 'You are afraid, you are 
`Ikhwān, you are cowards, we refuse you'».311 
The radicals’ wing was upset by the moderates' «betrayal». When joining the Brotherhood, 
they had affiliated with a peaceful organisation, long considered a collaborator with the authorities  
by many JI members. This kind of criticism have sustained up until this day, the violent groups 
denouncing the Brotherhood as a «domesticated opposition movement destine to remain weak so 
long as it participates in politics».312
When the second round of affiliations – involving students from the universities in Upper 
Egypt – became public in 1980, the leader of radical wing, Karam Zuhdī was furious, according to 
Māḍī.313 The disagreements in some governorates in Upper Egypt reached the point where mosques 
were divided, especially in al-Minyā and `Asyūṭ, and the different parties would engage in bloody 
fights with chains and knifes over who were to lead the ´Īd prayer.314 It should also be pointed out 
that the relations between the different factions remained peaceful on other occasions.315 
Despite hostility and abuse, the moderates of JI and Brotherhood leaders allegedly put down 
considerable work to try and win over radicals to their side or at least make them refrain from using 
violence: «The Brotherhood was not able to change the radicals' minds, nor were we. Karam Zuhdī, 
Nājiḥ `Ibrāhīm and `Usāma Ḥāfiẓ spoke many times with prominent Brotherhood leaders like al-
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Tilmisani and Mashhūr, but they would not change their minds», `Abū al-Futūḥ recalls.316
This effort seems to have continued until early 1981, when the group led by Māḍī invited all 
parts of JI, including the clique around Karam Zuhdī, to a meeting in al-Minyā. The backdrop for 
the meeting was information about training with weapons allegedly practiced by Zuhdī and his 
comrades in various apartments in al-Minyā at the time.317 Yet, the meeting came to nothing, as 
Zuhdī reportedly denied the information while angrily accusing the organisers of the meeting of 
drawing the suspicion of the Egyptian security forces.  
Thus, the attempts to get the violent wing of JI to show restraint proved futile. And, as 
indicated above, at the time Zuhdī and his circle had already taken their first few steps on the path 
of violence. Their first victims were Copts, as will be the concern of the next part of this chapter.
Clashing with the Copts 
The 1970s saw the nascent tension between Copts and Muslims, after decades of all but peaceful 
coexistence. One of the reasons for the sudden tension, Ansari notes, was president Sadat's 
increasing utilisation of Islamic symbols, which he initially used to combat the leftists in domestic  
politics.318 Coptic leaders were obviously displeased with these developments and what they saw as 
official tolerance of harassment of Copts by Islamists.319 Pope Shenūda III took on the regime in 
1978 when he cancelled the celebrations of Easter in protest against the treatment of Copts. 
The response from Sadat was devastating. Not only did he declare that Egypt was an Islamic 
state, he also accused the Coptic leaders of trying to create «a state within the state». The edgy 
relationship between Muslims and Copts somehow culminated in the clashes in the Cairo district of 
al-Zāwiyya al-Ḥamra in June 1981 where dozens were killed. In the aftermath of the  al-Zāwiyya 
al-Ḥamra incident Sadat refused to recognise Shenūda as Pope.
In this highly-strung atmosphere, how to treat the Copts naturally generated great debate 
within JI. Until the assassination of Sadat, it was also one of the few occasions where one part of JI 
used violence whereas the other denounced or abstained from it. 
Those belonging to the radical, violence-embracing faction in Upper Egypt, led by Karam 
Zuhdī, were very much in favour of attacking the Copts. They also did, starting in the early 1980s, 
arguing that the Copts should be the first victims of jihād.320 That robbing (and killing) Coptic 
goldsmiths also provided the group with money which gave them the opportunity to buy arms, 
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appears to have been a useful side effect. 
Zuhdī's affiliates in Cairo and the Delta saw things differently, however. There, the radicals
were reluctant to identify the Copts as the primary target and more concentrated on waging jihād 
against the state. 
There was also hostility towards the Copts within the moderate camp, although not going as 
far as to take up arms against them. Māḍī recalls, for instance, that most Islamic groups at the time, 
the Muslim Brotherhood included, looked upon the Copts as `ahl al-dhimma (non-Muslims who in 
return for special taxation should enjoy safety and protection), in his words a kind of second class 
citizens.321 This view resembles that of the Brotherhood's founder, Ḥasan al-Bannā, who preferred a 
treaty with non-Muslims where they would pay the jizya, the tax explained above.322 
`Abū al-Futūḥ on the other hand, says the influence from the Brotherhood brought with it 
respect for the Copts.323 It was the radical wing of JI, he claims, that classified the Copts as dhimma. 
This was allegedly debated within JI and disagreed upon.
There may even have been disagreements inside the moderate base on this question. 
Though, judging by what was communicated through the Brotherhood-controlled monthly al-Da
´wa, the reigning notion was that of the «ungrateful Copts»; in the view of both the Muslim 
Brotherhood and JI, no minority in the world enjoyed as much freedom as the Christians of Egypt.
324 The Copts exploited the hospitality though, aiming to control the country and its economy. Al-
´Aryān even claimed that the Copts were reviving their old ambition of setting up a state in upper 
Egypt with `Asyūṭ as its capital.325 JI also claimed that Christians and Jews were conspiring to 
discredit Islam on an international level and that the Copts of Egypt were the spearhead in this  
process. 
Though, despite the moderates' conspiracy theories and general suspicion, the Coptic 
question became yet another issue where the radicals preached the need for violence, while the 
moderates took a stand against the use of force; Karam Zuhdī spurred his followers on to smash 
liquor stores owned by Copts and attack Coptic students on campus, whereas JI leader Ḥilmī al-
Jazzār urged Muslims to boycott Coptic businesses in order to prevent the Copts from buying 
weapons.326
Al-`Aryān, though suspicious of the Copts, at any rate denounced those behind the 
destruction. In his view the violence underlined the weaknesses of the Islamic movement.
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The lack of support for the attacks among the moderates is depicting of how wide the gap between 
the violent and the non-violent camps had become.
Upper Egypt: Violence and a Weak Brotherhood
As I pointed out in the preceding part, the attacks on Coptic goldsmiths had a regional dimension to 
them. The Copts were the preferred targets for the Upper Egyptian radicals, whereas the radicals in 
the north favoured attacking the state in the fight for the implementation of the Islamic state. This  
different priorities reflects a historical division; while the Muslim Brotherhood, for instance – 
founded in `Ismā´īliyya north-east of Cairo – historically has had an international outlook, in Upper 
Egypt the focus has been on poverty and injustice in the south.327
This mentality can explain why the Brotherhood never had a large following in Upper 
Egypt, as two important issues during the `Ikhwān's first two decades were the struggle against the 
British and the Palestinian cause. For the Ṣa´āyida the campaign against Zionism must have 
appeared somewhat alien at a time where the majority of the population of the south were struggling 
to make ends meet under the authority of local landlords. Whereas for the British, they hardly had 
any military presence in Upper Egypt.328 
On top of that, the leadership of the Brotherhood had traditionally been rooted in the urban 
areas. Despite the fact that the movement also had a large following in rural regions, the decision-
making was done in Cairo and the Delta cities.329 
The repression during the Nasser era further weakened the `Ikhwān in the south.330 
Moreover, the Brotherhood did not increase their popularity when they supported the landowners 
against small farmers in a land reform during the first part of the 1970s.331 At that time, the 
movement's presence in Upper Egypt was more or less wiped out.332 
Hence it is not surprising that a majority of the JI leaders in al-Minyā and `Asyūṭ chose not 
to join the `Ikhwān when most of their northern colleagues affiliated.333 The recruitment activity on 
behalf of the `Ikhwān also met with staunch opposition in Upper Egypt, al-´Aryān underlines: 
It was only in al-Minyā and `Asyūṭ that a majority refused to join. One of the reasons 
was psychological. Some of the students in Upper Egypt were affected by elders who 
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were against the Muslim Brotherhood. And of course it played a role that the 
Brotherhood was not as strong in Upper Egypt as they were in the Delta and Cairo.334 
`Abū al-Futūḥ paints the same picture, stating that most JI members in the universities of Egypt had 
become affiliated with the Brotherhood by late 1979, except for JI in the universities of al-Minyā  
and `Asyūṭ.335
In refusing the Brotherhood, the JI in Upper Egypt fended off the `Ikhwān's message of non-
violence and moderation. `Asyūṭ seems to have been particularly receptive to the jihādī current. The 
Brotherhood were especially weak in `Asyūṭ, according to `Abū al-Futūḥ, and in 1979 the Jihadists 
camp managed to wrestle power from the local JI `amīr (leader), `Usāma Sayyid `Abd al-Ḥamīd.336 
He was known to have relations to the Brotherhood, his father being an old member of Tanẓīm 
1965.337 Nājiḥ `Ibrāhīm became new `amīr with the support of Karam Zuhdī, and consequently, 
`Asyūṭ became a stronghold for the radical wing of JI.
The leader of this wing that emerged at this time was the aforementioned Karam Zuhdī. 
Given the Brotherhood's weak role in Upper Egypt, there is good reason to believe al-Shaykh when 
he claims that Zuhdī did not have many difficulties establishing a JI wing independent of `Ikhwān 
domination.338 With the new leadership came a flow of impassioned speeches thrown by Zuhdī in 
the mosques and on the campus in `Asyūṭ, in which he stirred the excitement of the students and 
rallied part of the local leadership around him, according to Muḥammad al-Muntaṣir ´Abd al-Mun
´im ´Alī – better known as Muntaṣir al-Zayāt – a former JI member from `Aswān.339
In these speeches, Zuhdī insulted senior officials and attacked symbols of the regime.340 He 
also publicly denounced the Muslim Brotherhood and its followers among the students in what 
developed into a battle for the control of the mosques between the two factions of JI.341 At times, 
these struggles became violent and bloody, as mentioned above. According to Māḍī, the moderate 
wing was able to adjust the balance in their favour, though `Asyūṭ remained under the control of the 
Zuhdī camp.
It is also important to add that Zuhdī's violent conviction probably was more in line with the 
local customs. Many sources points to the tradition of blood feuds in Upper Egypt, and the 
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acceptance of violence as a means to settle conflicts.342 Or, in the words of `Usāma Ḥāfiẓ, at the 
time a member of the Zuhdī clique: «In the Ṣa´īd people are used to change things by hand, (bi-l-
yadd, i.e. by power). We broke up a lot of parties by force. These things happened in Cairo as well, 
but not as often as here».343 In addition to breaking up parties, the violent party would also smash 
liquor stores belonging to Copts and intimidate both students and regular citizens whose behaviour 
were deemed un-Islamic.344
The falling out with the Zuhdī group eventually lead the moderates to change the badge and 
slogan of their faction of JI to the one used by the Muslim Brotherhood. After the reports of the 
radicals' violent behaviour emerged, the moderates chose to abandon the name JI altogether in 
favour of The Muslim Brotherhood's.  
Regime Repression 
The Sadat regime's shift towards attempting to contain the Islamist current on the campuses of 
Egypt, resulted in the curbing of JI's dominance of student politics. The academic year of 1977-78 
saw JI sweep the student elections, winning a majority on eight out of twelve universities in Egypt. 
As we have seen however, this was also the time when JI developed into arguably the most 
powerful opposition force in the country. 
Undoubtedly the Sadat regime also began to see JI more as a threat than a source for 
support. As I have mentioned, the Minister of the Interior even asked `Umar al-Tilmisānī, the 
General Guide of the Muslim Brotherhood, to talk to the students in order to get them to abstain 
from violence. The regime went further however, and also banned students wearing traditional 
clothes – distinctive of the Islamists – on campus, in addition to expelling others from university.345 
Teachers and Islamic scholars were also urged to contribute to the halting of the Islamist tide. Early 
in 1978 al-Da´wa reported struggles between JI and «puppets» backed by the regime.346 The 
following months stories of persecution of JI members and attempts of stripping the organisation of 
its victory in the student elections appeared in the Islamist monthly. 
Later that year it became evident that the regime's target was a curtailing of JI's power on 
campus. Student elections were allegedly rigged and payments that were due various activities in 
the name of JI were cancelled. Furthermore, the popular summer camps in Cairo, Alexandria and 
Zāqāzīq organised by JI were disrupted by the government's security forces in the summer of 1978.
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A number of JI candidates had been omitted from the election lists already at the student 
polls for the academic year of 1977-78.347 Still, the Islamists did incredibly well at the elections, 
which in turn forced the deans at some faculties to cancel the results and choose the leaders of the 
faculty unions themselves. A new party was also established on campus, Ḥizb Miṣr (The Egypt 
Party), with the sole mission of circumscribing the power of JI on campus, according to the 
Islamists. 
In April 1979, fresh from the signing of the peace treaty with Israel in Washington and 
bolstered as the «peace president», Sadat delivered a speech in `Asyūṭ in which he launched an 
unprecedented attack on his critics. Those who walked around wearing the white jallabiyya and 
sported long beards were in fact communists and religion just a tool to disguise their political aims,  
Sadat claimed, with no attempt to conceal the addressees of his attack. 348 In the same speech he 
denounced JI by name and depicted the Brotherhood leader `Umar al-Tilmisānī a liar. 
The president had then set the stage for what was to come two months later. In June the 
General Union of Egyptian Student was banned and its assets frozen by decree 265. From here on, 
student unions were only allowed at faculty level where they were put under the control of the joint 
committee of teachers, students and administrators.349 On top of that, the University Guard, a 
security force, was reintroduced eight years after it was pulled out of campus.
The new law made it almost impossible for JI to keep their welfare program going, and 
many of their services were reversed by the new decree. With the welfare services gone, JI lost 
some of its appeal on campus, although they were able to keep some their activities going thanks to 
students' voluntary contributions.350
The organisational repression at the universities ran parallel to JI's demonstrations being 
quelled by riot police, often ending in violent clashes, as I pointed out earlier in the chapter.  
However, the new role as the «suffering leaders of the opposition» to the regime was not one 
immediately rejected by JI leaders. Moreover, in many ways it resembled the self-image of the 
Muslim Brotherhood who had been met with persecution as leaders of national resistance and 
fighters for social reform.351 
The clamp-down on their student activity forced JI out of campus, but the crackdown did not 
have the effect the regime had planned. On the contrary, JI expanded on to the streets, penetrating 
the popular neighbourhoods of the big cities and finding new recruits there.352 They also continued 
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their work through arranging conferences and publicising communiqués.353 
According to Kepel, JI was radicalised on their way out of the universities and into the 
streets, claiming that the moderate wing connected to al-Tilmisānī lost influence in favour of  
militant elements.354 Kepel points to articles in al-Da´wa warning students against «emotional 
actions» and appealing to moderation, and argues that these calls went unheeded. 
In my opinion, this is not quite the right interpretation of the events. As an example of the 
radicals' increasing influence, Kepel holds out the incident at the University of Alexandria on March 
24th 1980, where hundreds of JI members presented the dean of the Faculty of Science with an 
ultimatum. The ultimatum consisted of four demands; an end to interrogations of JI members, that 
«Islamic meetings» be organised at the faculty, that there would be no obstacles to Islamist 
candidates in the upcoming elections to the faculty student union and lastly, and end to festivals and 
screening of films. 
   When one examines these claims, what is striking is not their radical or jihādī  essence, but 
rather their quite peaceful nature. One of the demands concerns the right to participate unhindered 
in elections, another calls for interrogations of certain students to stop, while the third regard the 
desire to see the «Islamic meetings» reappear on campus. Only the demand to stop festivals and 
films has a degree of authoritarianism to it. It appears heavily influenced by Salafism, which is not 
surprising, given that the University of Alexandria had a substantial Salafist following earlier in the 
1970s.355     
If the demands of the Alexandria students express anything, it must be frustration with 
measures the considered repressive, not radicalism and militancy. 
The events that followed in `Asyūṭ and al-Minyā, were, as I have showed in earlier parts of 
this chapter, mainly driven by the jihādī  faction centred around Karam Zuhdī and his followers. 
This group was always hostile to the `Ikhwān. Therefore, since the Brotherhood's following in 
Upper Egypt never was extensive in the first case – also demonstrated earlier in the chapter – they 
can hardly be said to have lost their leverage, as Kepel claims. 
On the contrary, the late 1970s saw a great number of Islamist students join the `Ikhwān, 
even in the Ṣa´īd, where the leading figures i al-Minyā, Muḥyī al-Dīn ´Aīsā and `Abū al-´Ilā Maḍī, 
decided to affiliate with the Brotherhood while in jail in 1979.356 
On the whole, the moderate forces of JI seem to put less emphasis on the regime pressure 
when asked to explain the break up. The hostility from the government came late in JI's time span, 
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`Abū al-Futūḥ says, pointing out that the mass arrest did not take place until late 1981.357 He claims 
it did not play any role at all in the breaking up of the organisation and that at any rate, the 
repression under Sadat was not great.
Māḍī, a couple of years younger than `Abū al-Futūḥ, more or less shares this opinion. First, 
what pressure may have been, was not very strong, he says, even brushing aside the fact that he was 
thrown in jail for a period of two to three months.358 When confronted with the regime taking 
control over student politics, Māḍī says that this was not enough to break up the group. On the 
contrary, he points out, the pressure helped JI in a way: It heightened the tension inside the 
universities and made JI take the step from a student movement to a grassroots movement (ḥaraka 
sha´biyya).359
These moderates of JI are not alone in their view of the Sadat era as a relatively relaxed 
period. Shukrī Muṣṭafā, the leader of the Jamā´at al-Muslimīn, labelled the Egyptian state as 
jāhiliyya, but nonetheless declared that «there is no doubt that the Sadat regime is a thousand times 
better than Nasser's. Nasser would never have allowed us to act as we re now acting, nor to carry 
out our propaganda openly».360
There is not consensus however, when it comes to how big a part government pressure had 
in breaking up JI. According to Ḥāfiẓ, the membership in the armed groups that had started to form 
in Upper Egypt in the end of 1979 and the beginning of 1980, was quite limited until Sadat declared 
his qarārāt al-taḥaffuẓ  (mass arrests) in September 1981.361 Then their numbers increased, he 
claims.
 In these years the tension was increased by numerous house searches conducted by the 
authorities in order to confiscate hidden weapons in al-Minyā and `Asyūṭ.362 The radicals would also 
clash with the security forces, such as in November 1980, when the lectures at the University of 
`Asyūṭ were interrupted by violence.
There is no doubt that the pressure from above made life harder for JI as a student 
organisation. JI's loss of power on campus due to the regime's change of the laws regulating student 
elections is proof of that. However, whether the loss of power among at the universities and the 
subsequent clashes with the regime was the decisive blow to JI as an organisation with a broad 
appeal on campus, is rather doubtful in my opinion.     
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These questions will be dealt with in depth in the conclusion of the chapter. Before I reach 
that point, however, I will put forward one more factor that contributed to the downfall of JI in the 
late 1970s and early 1980s, namely the age of the founding generation of JI. 
Graduation and Fragmentation
Already in 1976 `Abū al-Futūḥ's class graduated and as a consequence many of the movement's 
figureheads were no longer to be found on campus.363
In itself this was not enough to break the organisation, as JI still had capable and charismatic 
leaders in its ranks – people like `Abū al-´Ilā Māḍī, Ḥilmī Jazzār and Muḥī al-Dīn ´Aīsā on the 
moderate side and Karam Zuhdī and Nājiḥ `Ibrāhīm among the more radical-minded. 
Although JI did not collapse after the graduation of its first generation, Māḍī, who belonged 
to what can be described as the second generation, says that it became harder to keep the 
organisation together after graduation: «We tried to keep the Islamic activities going in the 
universities with meetings for the graduates (liqā`āt al-khirrījīyin). In the beginning it was monthly 
meetings, then the intervals became longer and in the end we lost it».364
This activity seems to have been just as much an effort to strengthen the Brotherhood's hold 
on JI as an attempt to keep JI together. According to `Abū al-Futūḥ, the graduates was instructed to 
go home to their provinces and contact the JI leaders there.365 The aim appears to have been to 
bolster the ties between the local `Ikhwān leadership and the new generation of members, rather 
than consolidate JI's position in the provinces.  
Many of those figureheads mentioned considered their options when their time as students 
was drawing to a close, searching for a role outside the realm of the universities after graduation.366 
I have more than once emphasised the political mindset of what is described above as the first 
generation of JI. There is reason to believe that many of the politically ambitious young men 
already affiliated with the Brotherhood saw further ahead than just JI. ´Iṣām al-´Aryān, for instance, 
says that they faced two alternatives; Either they could set up their own organisation outside the 
universities, or they could join the Brotherhood.367 When they decided to join the Brotherhood, they 
did so wholeheartedly, as the developments in the ensuing decades is proof of. 
Although belonging to what I have described as the «second generation» of JI leaders, the 
words of `Abū l-´Ilā Māḍī is quite telling in this respect: «When we decided to become a serious 
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organisation, we joined the Muslim Brotherhood and JI separated».368 
And, as I have demonstrated earlier in the chapter, the affiliation with the Brotherhood was 
not taken lightly by the radical wing of JI and therefore contributed to factionalism and in the end 
the full split of the movement. 
Conclusion
This chapter have dealt with the deteriorating relationship between JI and the regime, starting 
briefly before 1977 and ending with the disintegration of JI and the assassination of president Sadat, 
both in 1981. 
The decline in the relationship between the Islamist movement and the regime was however 
not unique at the time. The criticism that followed the introduction of the multiparty system in  
1976, forced Sadat to reconsider this strategy, as Ibrahim underscores.369 JI was but one of the 
victims of the subsequent constriction of the political leeway. Yet, it was a far more potent 
movement from the mid 1970s than the severely weakened left which in turn made JI harder to 
repress. 
As this was a period when Sadat had raised the stakes of his policy, hoping to show the 
western world that Egypt could both adapt to a more market-friendly economic system and securing 
a peace agreement with the arch enemy Israel, it is not difficult to imagine that the regime was  
eager to demonstrate that it could keep its house in order. Hence it was less receptive to criticism 
than earlier in the decade. 
As I implied earlier in this chapter, however, the repressive measures from the government 
did not come until 1978-79. At that point, a majority of the founding generation of JI had already 
been members of the Muslim Brotherhood for a couple of years and were in the process of 
becoming convinced by al-Tilmisānī's non-violent line. The staunch opposition to Shukrī Muṣṭafā's 
Jamā´at al-Muslimīn is an example of this shift. The moderates' and the radicals' also differed on the 
view of the Coptic minority, even if the former's conception of the Copts' role in the future Islamic 
state was somewhat ambiguous. 
The non-violent line became the dominant one in Cairo and the Delta, only in Upper Egypt 
did it not fully penetrate the local JI. I believe there is sufficient grounds to suggest that the Upper 
Egyptian wing of JI was more radical than the ones in Cairo and the Delta. I have pointed out the 
368  Interview with `Abū l-´Ilā Māḍī, October 2010.
369 Saad Eddin Ibrahim, `I´āda al-i´tibār li-l-ra`īs al-Sādāt (Cairo: Dār al-Shurūq, 1992), 149-50.
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Brotherhood's failure to gain substantial support, and also highlighted the traditions of violence in 
the region. Another reason may be the rapid urbanisation that cities like `Asyūṭ and al-Minyā 
underwent. Growing populations led to social instabilities increasing the risk of violence.370 
Moreover, leading figures were in the process of leaving university and had to decide where 
to spend their forces. The solution was a tighter association with the Muslim Brotherhood, and 
although they did stay on as members of JI, it seems as if they more and more looked upon the two 
movements as one: «(...) the moment we, as officials of JI at the university, decided to affiliate with 
the Muslim Brotherhood (...) we became one organisation», as `Abū al-Futūḥ explains.371  
Thus, when the regime began its crackdown, JI was already in the process of splitting – 
although not openly. The violence-embracing wing, especially in `Asyūṭ, refused to follow the line 
of al-Tilmisānī, despite numerous attempts of persuasion. Among the moderates in the north on the 
other hand, the General Guide's non-violence policy was held in increasingly high esteem. 
Therefore, it was internal factors that ignited the process of splitting JI, and not the pressure 
from the regime, as put forward by Kepel. His focus on the external reasons for JI's division may be 
connected to his conception of JI as a more unified and radicalised organisation than I believe it  
was. Such an organisation would have been more likely to be broken up from the outside than the 
inside. However, as I have demonstrated more than once, the different members' views varied on 
several key issues. JI was therefore more likely to cause its own dissolution at some point, rather 
than be pressured into pieces. That said, the regime repression may have accelerated the slumbering 
divisions within the movement. 
370 Ansari, «The Islamic Militants in Egyptian Politics», Journal of Middle East Studies, vol. 16, no. 1 (March, 1984), 
130-31.
371 `Abū al-Futūḥ, Shāhid ´alā tārīkh al-ḥaraka al-ìslāmiyya fī miṣr 1970-1984, 91.
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Chapter V: Conclusion
I started my work on this thesis based on the following hypothesis: «The Muslim Brotherhood acted 
as a force of moderation within al-Jamā´a al-`Islāmiyya from the middle of the 1970s, which 
eventually led to the break-up of the organisation». 
The conclusion will be presented in three parts The first part will deal with the ideology of JI 
at the movement's initiation. Secondly, I will explain the process of affiliation with the Brotherhood,  
before I deal with the split within JI.
In the last part of the chapter I attempt to place the lessons of this thesis in the context of the 
situation in present day Egypt. 
Idealist and Salafist
In the presentation of my hypothesis, I put emphasis on the need to define JI's ideological starting 
point. This was done to enable me to point out a moderate development within the organisation at a 
later stage in the thesis.  
What defines JI at the offset is however the plurality of influences. The young students read 
the works of Mawdudi alongside al-Bannā and Quṭb, while also drawing influence from newly 
released Brotherhood members. At the same time, I have demonstrated a clear admiration for Quṭb 
and the «revolutionary spirit» that featured heavy in his works – even the moderate JI leaders were 
unwilling to denounce the principle of violence as a means for change up until the mid 1970s. 
Kepel's claim that JI was a radical organisation from its creation, is nonetheless a step too far 
in my opinion. 
If there was a dominant current, I would say it was Salafist. The clout of Salafism was 
expressed in the struggle for the separation of men and women in the lecture halls, and the 
promotion of Islamic dress and appearance. Moreover, the early years saw few demands with 
relation to politics as became more common later in the decade. The slogans focused on Salafi-
inspired symbolism and the implementation of the Sharia, while the JI members longed for a return 
to the Caliphate.
The «basic» and Salafi-inspired slogans undoubtedly functioned as rather uncontroversial 
rallying points which appealed to a broad segment of students. This is probably what caused Kepel 
to claim that JI shunned theoretical reflection in fear of a potential split, which I regard as an 
exaggeration. 
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Therefore, I would describe JI as a predominantly Salafist movement with radical tendencies 
when its leaders were approached by the Brotherhood in 1974. 
Moderation through Conversation
The subsequent process of affiliation with the `Ikhwān went about in three stages:
* The first period, lasting approximately one and a half to two years, consisted of meetings between 
senior Brotherhood members and leading figures in JI, described in chapter three. Pivotal in these 
conversations – kept secret from the JI leadership in Upper Egypt as well as the rank-and-file 
members – were the remnants of al-Niẓām al-Khāṣṣ and Tanẓīm 1965. Both their history as «hard-
liners» and their ordeals during long years in prison made an impression on the Islamist student 
leaders. This faction of the Brotherhood seems to have appealed more to the JI leaders in the 
beginning than the moderate line of the General Guide ´Umar al-Tilmisānī. 
* The second period consisted of long conversations with the likes of al-Tilmisānī. The role of 
violence in the struggle for an Islamic state was central in these discussions and al-Tilmisānī's 
conviction of the need to refrain from violence had a profound impact on the young JI leaders. They 
were eventually persuaded to adopt a non-violent stance, although they still harboured a certain 
scepticism towards the lack of Islamic symbols among the elders of the Brotherhood. 
* Regardless of certain disagreements that still existed, the JI leaders of Cairo and the Delta decided 
to join the Muslim Brotherhood. This took place in secrecy around 1976-77. From that point on, the 
northern leadership of JI was convinced Muslim brothers and the third stage therefore consisted of 
efforts to persuade other parts of JI to join. This struggle was particularly directed towards the 
students in Upper Egypt, where the Brotherhood's position historically have been weaker than in the 
north, as I pointed out in the fourth chapter.    
It is also important to stress that the Brotherhood also benefited highly from the affiliation of the JI 
figureheads, in whose wake followed the rank-and-file members. The General Guide al-Tilmisānī 
himself stressed the `Ikhwān's need for a student following at a time when the member base was 
substantially reduced due to nearly two decades of government repression. This move from al-
Tilmisāni cannot be described as anything other than a success as the JI leaders, also known as the 
70s generation, jīl al-sab´īnāt,  provided the Brotherhood with fresh blood. The young and 
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politically aware students also came to influence the `Ikhwān for decades to come.
The Great Divide
The affiliation with the `Ikhwān symbolised two important changes of direction that contributed to 
the division of JI. 
First, the northern JI leaders no longer saw violence as a question of timing, as had been the 
case before their discussions with al-Tilmisāni. From the late 1970s they promoted a non-violent 
line that was unacceptable to the radicals in Upper Egypt. 
Second, independently of the denouncing of violence, the mere affiliation with the 
Brotherhood was a source of controversy, as the secrecy is proof of. For many JI members, be they 
Jihadists or Salafists, the Brotherhood in and of itself represented weakness, collaboration with the 
regime and a departure from the ideal of a true Islamic state.
The internal divisions surfaced in 1979, when the affiliations with the Brotherhood became 
public. In the middle of 1980, two separate organisations formed: One that approved of, and in 
many cases encouraged, the use of violence in the struggle for an Islamic state, and another that 
renounced violence as a political tool. I have not found any connections between this dispute and 
the Sadat regime, and I therefore regard it as an internal struggle brought about by different views 
on violence.
Hence, JI was deep in the process of dissolution when the Sadat regime decided to 
circumscribe the power JI had amassed on the universities. JI was weakened as a student movement 
due to the new laws governing student elections introduced in 1979. At the same time, it enabled JI 
to develop into something more than merely a university movement, staging open air prayers in 
Cairo and Alexandria that drew tens of thousands of participants.
On its way out of the universities Kepel claims that JI was radicalised. I have found no 
grounds for this claim. The violent-radical axis had already been established at the time. The 
moderate wing did not become more radical as a result of the new university laws, and the enemy of 
the radicals had always been the regime. 
Hence, I do not support the view that JI was broken by the regime repression, although it 
may have accelerated the process to a certain degree. The wheels were already set in spin by the 
Muslim Brotherhood, as I have demonstrated in this thesis.
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Assassinations and Associations 
After the split, the moderate wing gave up the name of JI and started referring to themselves as 
members of the Muslim Brotherhood rather than JI. The radical faction kept the name and some of 
its members merged with Tanẓīm al-Jihād and participated in the futile insurrection in `Asyūṭ in the 
aftermath of the assassination of President Sadat on October 6th 1981. A number of JI members were 
handed long prison sentences in the trials that followed, among them Karam Zuhdī. 
During the 1980s and 1990s JI became infamous due to a series of attacks on tourists, Copts, 
policemen and politicians. However, after a massive crackdown on JI in the middle of the 1990s, JI 
agreed to a ceasefire with the government in 1997. Six years later, the organisation's leaders 
renounced violence and over the subsequent years thousands of its members were released.   
The moderates who joined the Muslim Brotherhood followed a quite different path. Leading 
members such as `Abū al-Futūḥ, al-´Aryān and Māḍī played crucial roles in the Islamists' take-over 
of the professional syndicates (al-niqābāt al-mihaniyya) in Egypt in the 1980s and 1990s. 
While Māḍī left the Brotherhood to form al-Ḥizb al-Waṣaṭ al-Jadīd in 1996, both `Abū al-
Futūḥ and al-´Aryān rose to become members of the Brotherhood's governing body, Maktab al-
`Irshād (the Guidance Bureau).372 
Shaping Egypt's Future
I opened this thesis with a reference to the January 25th Revolution and the sweeping changes Egypt 
has undergone the last months. The overthrow of President Mubarak has led to a growing focus on 
the Muslim Brotherhood as the biggest and best organised opposition force in Egypt. The increased 
political freedom after the regime's fall enabled the `Ikhwān to set up their own party, al-Hurriyya 
wa al-´Adāla (the Freedom and Justice Party), on April 30th this year. 
Although the `Ikhwān have participated in elections earlier, either on the lists of other parties 
or as independent candidates, the forming of a party is in many ways the end of a long journey that 
started with Ḥasan al-Bannā's attempt at standing for the parliamentary elections in 1942, continued 
through the Brotherhood's push for legal recognition during the reign of Sadat and the increasing 
activism in the subsequent decades and ending with final forming of a party. 
And despite the fact that the majority of the  jīl al-sab´īnāt now are in their late 50s and early 
60s, I have few doubts that they will play important roles in the shaping of a new political 
environment in an Egypt that hopefully will have a taste of democracy after over half a century's  
372 `Abū al-Futūḥ was a member of the bureau between 1987 and 2009, while al-`Aryān is a current memebers, holding 
the position of the Brotherhood's official spokesman.
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oppressive dictatorship. 
In that context, doubts about the Brotherhood's democratic credentials have been expressed 
time and again in Western media. The `Ikhwān have been portrayed as a movement that «despise 
and fear popular power and democratic institutions».373 Some politicians have been more bluntly, 
for instance Siv Jensen, the leader of the Fremskrittspartiet, a Norwegian right-wing populist party: 
«The Muslim Brotherhood is the source of all terror (…) If they gain power, the Middle East will be 
turned into a minefield».374
These are naturally ill-founded expressions of hostility and outright condemnation. And 
while a certain amount of caution is necessary in times of upheaval, I find it more fruitful to focus 
on the democratic experience many Brotherhood figureheads gained as student leaders in the 1970s. 
This work enabled them, says Utvik, to «break the confines of the Islamist movement and gain a 
broader outlook on society and politics».375 
One can hope that it will benefit Egypt in the time to come.
373 Kenan Malik, «The Muslim Brotherhood may gain power in Egypt by default», The Guardian, accessed May 3rd, 
2011. http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/belief/2011/jan/31/egypt-secular-protests
374 Lars Løkkebø, «Siv Jensen frykter Det muslimske brorskap», Telemarksavisa, accessed May 4 th, 2011. 
http://www.ta.no/nyheter/grenland/article5480448.ece
375 Utvik, «Hizb al-Wasat and the Potential for Change in Egyptian Islamism», 299.
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